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NO. 6253 
In the Supreme Court, State of Utah 
JOHN A. M .. A.LIA, State Bank Connnissioner 
of the State of Utah, and HER.B~-:Il'J' 'r.A.Y-
LOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquida-
tion of tl1e Bank of Heber City, 
vs. Plaintiffs and R.espondents, 
J. HAROLD GII_jES a11d JOSIE BAIR.D 
GILES, Defendants and Appellants~ 
A. C. MOULTON and E. DE"\~VEY ~IOUL'rON, 
vs. Plaintiffs and R.et;pondents, 
VERNOR E. BAIR-D and l\iARY A. BAIRD, 
His Wife, J. RULON ~fOR-GAN, J. R.UI_jON 
MORGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the 
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership, 
ELIZABETH J. BAIR-D, BANK OF HEBER 
CITY, RULON F. ST ARLEY~ State Bank 
Commissioner of the State of Utah, and 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in 
Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber 1410 
City, ARTHUR D1TKE and EULEAN DUKE, Civil 
Hjs Wife, RAY F. Sl\tfiTH and JOSIE BAIRD 
GILES Sl\1ITH, His Wife, and J. HAROLD 
GII_jES, Defendants and Appellants. 
J. RULON MORGAN, 
vs. Cross-Complainant, 
RULON F. ST ARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
TAYLOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
I1iquidation of the Bank of Heber City, j 
Cross-Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
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In the Supreme Court, State of Utah 
JOHN A. MALIA, State Bank Commissioner ) 
of the State of Utah, and HERBERT TAY-
LOR, as Examiner in Charge of the Liquida- 1266 
tion ?f the Bank of Heber City, \Civil 
vs. Plaintiffs and R.espondents, ) 
J. HAROLD GILES and JOSIE BAIR,D 
GII.JES, Defendants and Appellants: 
A. C. MOULTON and E. DE·WEY ~fOULTON, 
vs. Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
VERNOR E. BAIRD and MARY A. BAIRD, 
His \Vife, J. RULON ~IORGAN, J. RUI~O·N 
MORGAN, as the Surviving Partner of the 
Firm of Morgan & Morgan, a Co-Partnership, 
ELIZABETH J. BAIRD, BANK OF HEBER 
CITY, RULON F. ST ARLEY~ State Bank 
Commissioner of the State of Utah, and 
SPENCER C. TAYLOR, as Examiner in 
Charge of the Liquidation of the Bank of Heber 1410 
City, ARTHUR D1TKE and EUI_JEAN DUlCE, 'Civil 
His Wife, RAY F. SMITH and JOSIE BAIRD 
GILES SMITH, His Wife, and J. HAROLD 
GII.JES, Defendants and Appellants. 
J. RULON MORGAN, 
vs. Cross-Complainant, 
RULON F. ST ARLEY, as Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. 
'rAYI_jOR, as Examiner in Charge of the 
Liquidation of the Bank of Heber City, 
Cross-Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
THERE ARE T·WO CASES\ INVOLVED· IN THIS 
CONTROVERSY. 
The appellants, J. Rulon Morgan, J. Rulon Mor-
gan as executor of the last will and testamPnt of 
Elizabeth J. Baird, deceased, J. Rulon Morgan, as 
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2. 
the surviving partner of the firm of ~forgan & 
Morgan, Vernor E. Baird and his wife, Mary A. 
Baird, Josie Baird Gile8 (Smith) and her hus-
band, Ray F. Smith, jointly and severally pros-
ecute this appeal from the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court of Wasatch County, Utah. The judg1-
ment appealed from disposes of the issues raised 
in two causes of action, one numbered 1266 Civil, 
and the other numbered 1410 Civil. The two cause~ 
were tried ~ogether, and, upon stipulation of coun-
sel, the cases were cons,olidated for all purposes. 
( Tr. 117; A b. 75). Substantially all of the issues 
raised by the plaintiffs in Cause No. 12:66 Civil are 
also raised by the pleadings in Cause No. 1410 
.Civil. 
STATEMENT OF CASE IN NUMBER 1266 
CIVIL 
In case numbered 1266 Civil the Bank of Heber City 
and its examiner in charge, Herbert Taylor, Bank 
Commissioner of Utah, brought an action agiainst 
Josie Baird Giles and .J. Harold Giles to recover 
judgment on a note executed by J. Harold Giles for 
the p.rincipal sum of Two Thousand, Five Hundred 
Flifty ('$2550.00) Dollars. The note is dated A.pril 
26, 1933. There is no controversy as to the amount 
owing on the note. The question '\Vhich divides the 
parties in 1266 Civil is whether or not the Bank of 
Hel')er City, and those in control of its assets, has a 
lien on forty-nine shares of water stock in the Lake 
Creek Irrigation Company as security for the pay-
ment of the note sued upon. The p~laintiffs in that 
case contended that they do have such a lien by 
reason of the certificates having been hypothecated 
to the Biank of Heber City as s.ecurity for the note. 
The appellants contend to the contrary, because. as 
tho~.,. ·claim, the name of Josie Baird Giles (Sn1ith) 
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3 
\Yas forged on the certificates and that no authority 
'vas ever given to J. Harold Gile~ to hypothecate the 
water stock as security for the note. The court be .. 
low ;held that the plaintiffs in that case had a lien 
upon the certificates and entered a decree directing 
that said certificates be sold and sufficient of the 
proceeds derived fron1 su<:h sale be applied to the 
payment of the note. 1\ppellants prosecute this 
appeal and seek a reversal of that part of the de-
cree w ..hich awards plaintiffs a lien on the certifi-
cates and directs that the same be sold at sheriff's 
sale and sufficient of the proceeds from the sale be 
applied to the payment of the note, attorneyH' fees 
and costs. 
STATE·~fENT OF CASE NO. 1410 
In case No. 1410 Civil, A. C. Moulton and E. De,vey 
Moulton brought an,action to recover a judgment 
on a note for the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand 
Dollars ~nd to foreclose a mortgage on a tract of 
land, together with the certificates. of water stock 
held by the Bank of Heber City and othe,r water 
rights appurtenant to the land covered by the 
mortgage. The note and mortgage sued upon by 
the Moultons is signed hy Vernor E. Baird and 'his 
wife, Mary A. Baird, in favor of Josie Baird Giles 
(Smith), but the Moultons claim title to the note 
and mortgage by reason of having attached and 
later purchased under a.n execution sale the notr- and 
mortgage in an action brought by the M.oultons 
against J. Harold Giles and Josie Baird Giles. The 
appellants, by their variouR answers. deny that the 
Moultons have any right to maintain their action 
because: 
1. 
The note and mortgage which the Moultons ~eek 'to 
foreclose was. p-rior to the time the l\foultons 
attempted to levy on the note and mortgage, by 
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mutual agreement of Josie Baird Giles (Smith), 
Vernor E. Baird and Elizabeth J. Baird cancelled, 
and that pursuant to such agreement, prior to the 
attempted purchase of the note and mortgage by 
the Moultons at the sheriff's sale, such mortgage 
was released and the land and water right covered 
by the mortgage conveyed to Elizabeth J. Baird. 
') 
~-
That the Moultons did not acquire any title to the 
note and mortgage which they seek to foreclose be-
cause: 
(a) The note and mortgage which the 
Moult.ons seek to foreclose was helrl by 
George B. Stanley, attorney for Josie 
Baird Giles (Smith) ''and Vernor E. Baird, 
and by him turned over to the sheriff of 
Wasatch County so that such sheriff could 
sell the same to satisfy a claim in favor of 
the Moultons, who were also represented 
by Mr. Stanley when he delivered the note 
to the sheriff. 
(b) That the attachment, the execution, 
the notice of sale and the attempted sale 
of the note and mortgage \Vere each and all 
null and vo(id{- because not ronducted in 
conformity with law and therefore they 
have no right, title or interest jn the note 
and mortgage. 
(c) That the Moultons having paid only, 
or pretended to pay, the nominal sum of 
One Hundred Dollar~ 'for the note for Fif-
teen Thousand Dollars, together with 
several years accrued interest thereon, such 
sale is unconscionable land void. 
(d) That in any event the Moultons 
acquired only such interest in the note and 
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5 
n1ortgage as "\Yns O\Yned by Josie Baird 
Giles (Smith) at the time of the levy, and 
Josie Baird Giles (Smith) having no inter-
est, or at most a defeasible rig~ht to the 
note and mortg-age, the 1\loultons, by the 
attachment and levy or execution and sale, 
acquired no enforceable right in the note 
and Inortgage "\vhich 'they s,eek to foreclose. 
(e) That prior to the pretended p~urchase 
of the note and mortgage, the mortgage 
had been released and the p-roperty con-
veyed to Elizabeth J. Baird, which release _ 
and conveyance were of-record in the office 
of the County Recorder of Wasatch County, 
l~tah. 
In case No. 1266 Civil, J. Rulon 1\{organ filed a 
cross-complaint against the State Bank Commis-
sioner, the Bank of Heber City and Spencer C. 
Taylor, examiner in charge of the Bank of Heber 
City, in which it iB 1claimed tnat Elizabeth J. Baird 
is the owner of the water stock in any event because 
of having purchased the same from the Lake Creek 
Irrigation Company after that company ·had pur-
chased that water stock because an assessment 
levied thereon had not been paid, and also because 
the water right representPd by the certificate of 
water stock had been-· acquired by Elizabeth J. 
Baird bv reason of adverse use of such 'vater by 
.. - . 
Elizabeth J. Baird. 
The court below held that the Moultons were the 
O\Yners of the note and mortgage upon which they 
sue and directed that the mortgage be foreclosed 
and the proceeds of the sale thereof he applied to 
the payment of the judgment which the Moultons 
h0ld Rffainst J. Harold Gile~ and Josie Baird Giles 
(Smith), which judgment is in the sum of Fonr 
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6 
'rhousand Nine Hundred Seventy-four Dollars and 
sixty-seven cents, together v.rith interest thereon 
from October 3, 1934, and costs in the sum of Four-
teen Dollars t'venty cents. The appellants proB-
ecute this appeal to revers.e the judgment in favor 
of the Moultons. 
After the court below orally announced that the 
Bank of Heber City and its examiner in charge, 
Spencer C. Taylor, and the Bank Commissioner of 
Utah were entitled to prevail on their claim to a 
lien on the two certificates of water stock in the 
Lake Cree.k Irrigation Company, and also after 
the court below had orally announced that tho 
Moultons were entitled to ~ue upon the fifteen 
thousand dollar note and foreclose the mortgage on 
the land and water stock mentioned and described 
in the mortgage, Josie Baird Giles (Smith) and J·. 
Rulon Morgan, as executor of the estate of Eliz-
abeth J. Baird, Deceased; filed a petition wherein 
Morgan) as executor of the estate of Elizabeth J. 
Baird, Deceased, sought to P.nforce a claim of home-
stead against the property involved in this con-
troversy, by reason of the fact that Josie Baird 
Giles (Smith) had such claim at the time she con-
veyed the land and "'\Vater stock covered by the 
mortgage to Elizabeth J. Baird. and therefore 
Elizabeth J. Baird acqu]recl nn interes.t in the prop-
prtv so conveyed to heT to the extent of a.11v claim 
of homestead that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) had 
at the time .of the conveyance to he·r mother, Eliz-
abeth J. Baird. The court below denied any claim 
of a homestead. The appe-llants also attack that 
'part of the judgment which denies the claim of a 
homestead for and on behalf of J. Rulon Morg~n 
as executor of the last will and testament of Eliz-
abeth J. Baird, Deceased. 
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ASSIGN~IEXTS OF. ERROR IN C.A.USE NO. 
1266 CIVIL 
The :appellants haYe fifty-fiYe1 assignn1ents of 
error. Of these assignments those nu1nbered 9, 24,-
25, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 ,48, 50, 51, 52, J.), 
54 and 55, Ab. 225 to 244, 'attack the finding·s, con-
clusions of la'\v and decree 'Yith respect to the claim 
of liens by the plaintiffs in cause numbered 1266, 
the Bank of Heber City, its examiner in charge of 
the liquidation thereof and the Bank Commissioner 
of Utah. 
THE QUESTIONS PR.ESENTED FOR DE-
TER~IINATION BY ASS I G Nl\f EN T S 
TOUCHING THE CLAIM. OF A I1IEN 0], 
THE BANK O,F HEBER CITY, rri-IE EX-
AMINER IN CH.P.LRGE OF THE LIQUID.t\-
TION THERE,OF AND THE BANI( COM-
MISSIONER OF UTAH .. 
The questions presented for determination by the 
assignments affecting the claim of a lien of the 
Bank of Heber City, the examiner in charge of the 
liquidation thereof and the Bank Commissioner of 
Utah are these : 
1. 
May a husband, without the knowledge or consent 
of his wife, {take certificates of '\Vater stock belong-
ing to the wife and lawfully hypothecate· the same. 
to secure his personal note~ 
2. 
If the husband takes Rnch certificates of his wife 
w·ithout her kno,vledge or consent and hypothecates 
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them to secure his personal obligations to a bank, 
may such bank successfully maintain a lien on such 
certificates of stock as security for a note executed 
by the husband s.ome four years after it first re-
ceived the certificates, in the absence of the con-
sent of the wife to have her water stock used by 
the husband for such purpose. 
May a bank successfully maintain the claim of be-
ing a bona fide holder for value of a certificate of 
stock where the blank endorsement on the back of 
such certificate is forged and lrnovvn to be such by 
the officer of the bank 'vho accepts the ·certificate 
as security for a loan. 
4. 
May a hank successfully maintain the claim of be-
in-g a bona fide holder for value of a certificate of 
stock endorsed in very light lead pencil by a wife 
when such certificate is accompanied by another 
certificate of stock upon which the wife's signature 
is forged and the officer of the bank 'vho accepts 
the certificates knows that the signature ·on the 
accompanying certificate is not that of the wtfe, 
where the husband presenb:; the two certificates to 
secure a personal loan for himself. 
5. 
Does the fact that a husband attends to his 'vife's 
business and the wife occasionally draws che·cks on 
the hus.ba.nd 's bank account preclude the wife from 
questioning the right of the ba~k to a lien on cer-
tificates of stock which have, without the lmo\\'ledge 
or consent of the wife, been hypothecated to the 
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bank to secure the payment of his personal note, 
especially \vhere ;there is no plea of an estoppel. 
6. 
May a bank "rhich holds certifi,cates of \Vater stock 
maintain a lien thereon against one \\rho has pur-
chased the stock from the company "' ..hich issued 
the same and "rhich has levied an aRs.essment there-
on and because of non-payment of the assessment 
has purchased the same and resold it to another. 
7. 
May a bank which receives certificates of \Vater 
stock'from the husband of the ovlner thereof main-
tain a lien thereon where th~ wat.er rep1resented by 
the certificates of stock has been sold and by war-
ranty deed conveyed to another who has used such 
water advers.ely under a claim of rig-ht for ten 
years prior to the time such o\vner's right is brought 
in question. 
ASSIGN~IENTS OF ERROR TOUCHING THE 
CL ... t\.IMS OF THE MOULTONS, PL.A.L\IN-
TIFFS IN CAUSE 1410 CIVIL. 
Of the fifty-five assignments of error filed, those 
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 2.3, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 321 
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 51, )52, 
53, 54 and 55 attack the proceedings had and the 
findings, conclusions and judgment made in favor 
of A. C. Moulton and E. Dewey lVloulton> who were 
the plaintiffs in cause numbered 1410 Civil. 
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QUESTIO,NS PRESENTED FOR DETERMINA.-
TION IN THE ACTION BRO,UGHT BY 
THE MOULTONS IN CAUSE NO. 1410 
CIVIL. 
The questions presented for determination as to 
the Moultons, who were the plaintiffs in Cause No. 
1410 Civil, are as follows: 
1. 
Does the preponderance of the evidence support 
the finding made by the court below to the effect 
that no agreement was had between \Tern or E. 
Baird, Josie Baird Giles (Smith) and Elizabeth J. 
Baird, whereby the fifteen thousand dollar note 
was cancelled, the mortgage given to secure the 
same released, and the property covered by the 
mortgage conveyed by Vern or E. Baird to Eliz-
abeth J. Baird in payment of money owing lJy 
Josie Baird Giles (Smith) to Elizabeth J. Baird. 
2. 
George B. Stanley having acted for .Josie Baird 
Giles (Smith) and Vern or E. Baird in preparing 
the documents whereby Josie Baird Giles (Smith) 
sold and conveyed the land and water right to Ver· 
nor E. Baird and the note and mortgage from Ver-
nor E. Baird and his wife to Josie Baird Giles 
(Smith), and he, George B. Stanley, having retained 
poss,ession of the note, may a valid attachment or a 
valid sale under execution be made by a sheriff 
where the note was delivered to the sheriff by 
Georf.!e B. Stanley so that he, George B. Stanley, 
and his other clients the ::1\foultons, could collect 
the'ir judgment against Josie Baird Giles (Smith) 
and J. Harold Giles. 
~ 
Was the affidavit of the Moultons for a 'vrit of 
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attachment a sufficient compliance with the pro-
visions of R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1 and 104-18-3 to 
authorize the county clerk of .,v-asatch County, Utah 
to issue a "Trit of attachn1ent. 
4. 
Did the wilful delivery of the note to the s.heriff of 
Wasatch County, Utah, by George B. Stanley, the 
agent and attorney of Josie Baird Giles (Smith), 
without her knowledge or consent, constitute a 
valid levy of attachment or an execution sale of the 
note. 
5. 
Does the _preponderance of the evidence, or any of 
the evidence, support the finding that George B. 
Stanley did not have possession of the note involved 
in this controversy as the attorney for \7 ernor E. 
Baird or Josie Baird Giles (Smith), or any of the 
defendants. 
6. 
Was the bond furnished by the ~foultons for the 
writ of attachment a sufficient compliance \vith 
the provisions of R. · S. U. 1933, 104-18-4 to author-
ize the sheriff to attach the note in question. 
7. 
Does the return of the sheriff show that he com-
plied with the law in advertising the note for sale. 
8. 
Was it competent for the Moultons to show, over 
the objections of the appellants, that the return 
made by the sheriff \Vas not in conformity with 
the facts. 
9. 
Does the evidence, including the testimony of the 
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sheriff, show that the notice of the time and pJace 
of the sale was posted as by law required. 
10. 
Does the p.reponderance of the evidence show that 
the sheriff sold the note to the Moultons as. by the 
notice directed, or that the time of sale mentioned in 
the notice was postponed. 
11. 
Will a ~court of equity sustain the 1sale of a secured 
note for fifteen thousand dollars, together with 
several years accrued interest thereon, for the sum 
of one hundred dollars. 
12. 
In ligiht of the fact that the water s.tock which 
Josie~~Baird Giles (Smith) sold to Vernor E. Baird 
was ·held and claimed by the Bank of Heber City, 
did not Vernor E. Baird have an absolute right to 
rescind the contract for the purchase of the land 
and water right covered by the mortgage and con-
vey the prop·erty back to Josie Baird Giles (S1nith) 
or her nominee, Elizabeth J. Baird. 
13. 
If Vern or E. Baird had an absolute right to rescind 
the contract. of sale and purchase of the land and 
water right and the giving of the note and mo.rt-
gag18 as evidence of the pi1rchase price· as against 
Josie Baird Giles (Smith), did he not also have such 
right as against any claim the Moultons may have 
acquired by' the purchase of the note. 
14. 
Does the evidence support the finding that Eliz-
abeth J. Baird did not, during her lifetime, pur-
chase certificates No. 64 and 68 from the La.ke Creek 
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Irrigation Company, 'rhich had acquired such cer .. 
tificates by purchasing the same to pay delinquent 
assessments thereon. 
15. 
Did not Josie Baird Giles (Smith) have a right to 
the claim of a homestead to the note in question 
'vhich she had an absolute right to release upon the 
condition that Vernor E. Baird convey the prop-
erty covered by the mortg~age in question to her 
mother, Elizabeth Jo Baird. 
ARG1Th1ENT TOUCHIXG THE CLAIMED I~IEN 
OF THE BANK OF HE:BER CITY AND ITS 
SUCCESSORS~ 
In the main there is no conflict in the 'evidence 
touching the claimed lien of the B·ank of Reher City 
and its successors. These facts are established 
without any conflict in the evidence: 
Prior to May 21, 1929, J. Harold Giles had, from 
time to time, borro,ved money from the Bank of 
Heber City, and given his notes as evidence of the 
loans. On or· about May 21, 1929 he executed a re-
ne,val note for Seventeen Hundred Dollars (Tr. 181; 
Ab. 151). At the time the Seventeen Hundred Dul-
lar note was given to the bank, J. Harold Giles de-
posited with the bank t\vo certificates of stock in 
the I1ake Creek Irrigation Company. On the hack 
of each certificate· "ras endorsed in blank the nan1e 
of .Josie Baird Giles.. In neither of the certificates 
was there a specified person named as endorsee. 
There was a blank space for the endorsee~ but the 
hlnnk ''""flS not filled in. The signature of Jo~ie 
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Baird Giles on Certificate No. 68 is not her sig-
nature. (Finding 24; Ab. 95). \All of the evidence 
supports that finding. The signature on Certifi-
cate No. 64 is written in very faint lead pencil. 
There is a cross in front of the signature. The 
court found that the signature on Certificate No. 
64 is the signature of Josie Baird Giles (Finding 
24; A b. 95). There is a conflict in the evidence as 
to whether or not the signature on Certificate No. 
64 is that of .Josie Baird Giles. J. Harold Giles 
testified that the signature on the back oi Certifi-
cate No. 64 looks like the signature of Josie Baird 
Giles and that he would say it was her signature. 
(Tr. 299; Ab. 176). Josie Baird Giles testified that 
the signature on Certificate No. 64 looked some-
thing like her signature but that her best judgment 
was that it was not her signature. (Tr. '258 to 263; 
A b. 166 to 169). 
:All of the evidence is to the effect that Josie Baird 
Giles did not authorize anyone to sign her ·name to 
either of the certificates and that she did not author-
ize her then husband, J. Harold Giles, to deliver 
the same to the Bank of Heber City· as security for 
any loan. (Testimony of Josie Baird Giles, Tr. 
258-259; Ab. 168). Such is also the effect of the 
testimony of J. Harold Giles (Tr. 2'95 to 299; Ab 
175-176). "While the name of W. Emer Murdock 
appears as a witness to the shmature of Josie Baird 
Giles, no claim is made by ~!fr. Murdock. or any-
one, that Josie signed either of the certificates in 
his presence. Mr. Murdock placed his signature 
nn the rprtificatPs so thRt they could he turned over 
to the Federal Reserve Bank as security. (Tr. 183; 
... L\b. 151). Thus the evidence shows, without con-
flict, that Josie Baird Giles did not authorize her 
then husband, J. Harold Giles, to hypothecate 
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either of the certificates to secure the loan made to 
J. Harold Giles. 
We ha,.,.e attacked the court's finding tha.t the sig-
nature on Certificate No. 64 i-, that of J-osie Baird 
Giles (Assigmnent -!-±; Ab. :24:2), but as the evi-
dence is brief and there are in the exhibits sig-
natures of Josie Baird Giles 'vhich she signed at 
the time of the trial, and also her signature in the 
divorce proceeding~s against J. Harold Giles, we 
direct this Court's attention to those signatures, 
which the Court, if it deems the matter material, 
may examine. It may here he said that no claim is' 
made that J. Harold Giles had any interest in 
either of the certificates. They were the absolute 
property of Josie Baird Giles. They were part· of 
the property which she inherited from her father. 
(Finding 24; A b. 95). At the time the Seventeen· 
Hundred Dollar note was executed and the certifi:-
cates left 'vith the bank, J. Harold Giles signed a 
pledge agreement, Exhibit B-2. The pledge agree-
ment does not p~urport to bind Josie Baird Giles. 
After the Seventeen Hundred Dolla.r note was 
signed, payments w~re made thereon and renewal 
notes signed for any balanee unpaid on the original 
note and for additional money loaned to J. Harold 
Giles. Josie did not sign any of these notes. At 
one time a payment of Fifteen Hundred Dollars 
was made on the Se, ... enteen Hundred Dollar note, 
reducing it to Two Hundred Dollars. (1_1e3ttmony 
of Riley C. Draper, Tr. 200-201; Ab. 154). 
The evidence also shows that Josie .kept the certifi-
cates 'in an envelope in her trunk ( rrr. 280-2Rl ; A b. 
172). The first that Josie learned that the bank 
held her certificates was in 1933 when her mother, 
Elizabeth J. Baird, ·wTote to her while she was. in 
California. That ",.aR after the Bank of Heber 
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City had closed, which was on August 29, 1933. 
When Josie came back to Utah she made inquiry 
at the bank as to her .certificates and was informed 
that the note and certificates were held by the 
Federal Reserve Bank at Salt Lake City. I.1ater 
Josie went to Salt Lake City and asked to see the 
certificates. She was informed that the certifi-
cates were in the vault and that she ·was unable 
to see them.· She informed the bank that she had 
not signed tne certificates.. She was infor1ned by 
the hank that there was a cross opposite her nauw. 
and probably th~ certificates had been sent to her 
for her signature. · (Tr. 253, 255; A b. 166-167). 
- -- - . ---~·, . - r, . 
Notwithstanding there was no pleading which even 
remotely suggested that Josie Baird Giles "'as 
estopped from ~etting up the defense that she dirl 
not sign or authorize anyone to sign the certificates 
and did not authori~e J. Harold Giles to hypoth-
ecate her certificates as s.ecurity for a loan made 
hy the. bank to him, the court below admitted evi-
dence tending to show that J. Harold Giles attended 
to the business of his- then wife, Josie Baird Giles, 
from 1926 to 19297 and that Jo~ie Baird Giles. at 
times drew checks on the account of her then hus-
baniL J. ,.Harold Giles, about like the other wives 
- ·in Heber .-City. (Testimony of Josie Baird Giles, 
· Tr. 268 to 290; A b. 168 to 194. Testimony of J . 
. ·Harold· Giles, Tr. 295-296; A h. 175-176; Testimony 
of Mr. Murdock, Tr. 198; Ah. 153). It al~o appears 
that in about 1929 ,Josie Baird Giles sold a home 
for the sum of about Twenty-five Hundred Dol-
la.rs. The money she secured from the sale of the 
. home sbr- lraned to her husband, J. Harold Giles, 
and took his note for Twenty-five Hundred Dol-
lars. (Exhibit No. 11; Tr. 291; Ab. 174-175). 
Suit was brought on the note involved in this litiga-
tion on .. A.ngust 14, 1934. It "ras upon substantially 
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the foregoing evidence that the court below made 
its finding·s and rendered its judgn1ent, holdjng 
that the plaintiff Bank of Heber City, Spencer 0. 
Taylor in charge of the liquidation of the bank, and 
the State Bank Commissioner of lJtah had a lien 
upon the certificates of stock a.s security for the 
payment of. the note. 
The appellants have, by their assignments of error, 
attacked those findings, by which the trial ,court in 
effect found that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) had 
hypothecated the certificates of stock to the Bank 
of Heber City, and that it and its successors have a 
lien upon the stocki a.s security for the payment of 
the note of J. Harold Giles.. The assignments 
which attacked such findings are 14, 15, 41, 43, 44, 
45 and 46; Ab. 233 to 242. By assignments No. 48, 
50, ~1 and 52, Ab. 242, 243, appellants have attacl{ed 
Conclusions of Law No. 2, 5, 6 and 9, where the 
court below concluded that the Bank of Heber City 
acquired and still holds a valid lien up,on the t'vo 
certificates of stock involved in this controyersy. 
By assignment No. 49 appellants attack that part 
of the -decree wherein it is directed that the stock 
be sold and the proceeds be applied by the hank to 
the payment of the ·amount owing upon the note of 
J. Harold Giles. All of these assignn1enb;; of error 
may well be discussed together, and "\Ve shall so 
discuss them. 
The Bank of Heber City did not acquire a lien on 
the certificates of stock and its SUCCe8HOrS do not 
have such a lien. The la vv is "rell settled that since 
certificates of stock are not negotiable instruments, 
a transferee acquires no bettE:lr )title than his trans-
feror had unless the circumstance~ are ~uch as to 
er('at~ an estop·pel jn hiR favor. It follovvs that. a 
trnn~fer of· a certificate of stock, even to a bona 
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fide purchaser or pledgee by one 'vho has no title 
or authority to transfer thQ same·, gives the trans-
feree no title to the stock as against the true owner, 
unless the latter is, for some reason, . e~topped to 
assert his title, or exceprt in those jurisdictions 
which have adopted the Uniform Stork Transfer 
Act. 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, \7" olun1e 
12, Pa.ge 58, ·Section 5542. 
Among the cases cited in support .Qf and 'vhieh do 
8Upp~rt the text are the following: 
E. Birmingham Land Company v. Dennis, 
95 Ala. 565; 5 So. 317. · 
Doran v. Miller, 124 Ill. A.pp. 56; 151 Ill. 
52'6, affirmed, 245 Ill. 200; 91 N. E. 
1029. 
BorBtaw v. City Trust Company, 216 Mass. 
330; 103 N. W. 915. 
Shuma.cker v. Green-Hanenea Copper Co., 
157 Minn. 124. 
Knox v. Eden Muss·ee American Co., 148 
N. Y. 441; 42 N. E. 988. 
Biddle v. Boyard, 13 Pa. St. 150. 
In the absence of a statute the law announced in 
the foregoinm text and cases seems to be well settled 
and to the effect that shares of s.tock represented 
by a certificate are 'in the main subject to the san1e 
rules of law that app,ly to the sale of personal prop-
erty, and that certificates are not in any sense 
negotiable instruments. 
We do not have the Uniform Tr:=tnsfer Act, but we 
do hav~ a number of statutory provisions touching 
the transfer of stock in a corporation. The owner 
of a certificate of stock does not pa.ss title thereto 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
if the delivery is made "'ithout authorization of the 
owner, unless the certificate has been transferred 
to a purchaser for value in good faith, \Yithout the 
notice of any fact making the transfer wrongful, 
where the injured person has elected to_, \vaive the 
injury or has been guilty of laches in endeavoring 
to enforce his right. 
R. S. U. 1933, 1S-3-7. 
''The person to ,,,.hom a certificate was 
originally issued is the person appearing 
by the certificate to be the owner thereof 
and of the shares represented thereby, un-
til and unless he endorses the certificate to 
another specified person, and thereupon 
such other specified person is the person 
appearing by the certificate to be the owner 
thereof until and unless he also endorses 
the certificate to another specified person. 
Sub~equent special endorsements may be 
made with like effect. ' ' 
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-19. 
As to Certificate No. 68 'vhich contains a forged 
blank endorsement, the authorities are all to the 
effect that such an endorsement did not convey any 
right or title to the Bank of Heber City. The law 
to that effect is so uniform that we refrain fro1n 
citing cases in support thereof. Such is the law 
even where the endorsee does not know the sig-
nature on the certificates is forged. !Ir. Murdock 
testified that he had cashed checks signed by Josie 
Baird Giles drawn on the account of J. Harold 
Giles. In such case Mr. Murdock cannot be heard 
to say that he did not know the signature of Josie 
Baird Giles or that the signature on Certificate 
No. 68 "'"as not a forgery. Whatever right a bus-
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band had in the property of his wife under the old 
common la-\v, there can be no controversy that the 
law in this jurisdiction gives to the wife the same 
right to own and dispo~e of her prop,erty as is given 
to a husband. 
R. S. U. 1933, 40-·2-1 to 10. 
A hus-band cannot, without the wife's consent, give 
a lien on the property of his wife. 
Morrison-Merrill & Company v. Close, 20 
Utah 432; 59 P. 235. 
While there is evidence in this record tending to 
show that the signature on Certifi-cate 64 is that 
:of Josie Baird Giles, still, even if that be true, the 
bank may not be said to have received that c.er-
tificate without notice of its infirn1ities.. 1'he f8ct 
that Certificate No. 64 accompanied Certificate No. 
68, which was forged, is a circumstance that should 
have put the bank on notice. So ah;;o the fact that 
the I signature was in very faint lead pencil and the 
signature was not witnessed 'vhen received by the 
bank indicates that there "Tas some irregularity 
ronnected with the signature- of Josie. The hank 
could not close its eyes to thos.e irregularities. 
10 C. J. S., Section 326, P·ag;e 823, and 
10 C. J. S., Section 328-B, Page 826, 
and cases there cited. 
West v. Tin tic Standard !Jiining Con1pany, 
71 Utah 158; 263 P. 490. 
Moreover, the Bank of Heber (~iiy is chargeable 
~rith notice of the fact that Josie Baird Giles was 
the o'vner of the certificates· and the s.tock repre-
sented thereby at the time they were delivered to 
the bank by J. Harold Giles. That is true even 
though the blank endorsement on the certificates 
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were in all respects regular. It 'vill be noted that 
the name of. the transferee does not appear on the 
certificates. Josie Baird Giles therefore appeared 
to be and "Tas the owner thereof u11til and unless 
she endorsed the certificates to a specified person. 
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-19. 
Ther~ being no specified person to \Vhorn the cer-
tificates were endorsed, th~ bank knew, or should 
have known, that the certificates belonged to Josie 
Baird Giles. In this connection it may be observed 
that J. Harold Giles in signing the pledg~e agree-
ment did not even purport to pledge the interest 
of his 'vife Josie in either of the certificates. There 
is not in this record the slightest sugg~estion that 
J. Harold Giles had any interest in the certificates 
except that in his testimony he suggests "I took 
~he certificates to the hank beeause I thought we 
were in business-partnership - was married and 
I was doing her business." If a husband, upon 
such a pretext, can dissipate his \vife 's, es,tate, then 
indeed is the law touching the right of a married 
woman to own, and control her property rendered 
a farce. It is quite common for a husband to do 
business (whatever may he meant by business) for 
his wife, and the wife to do business for the hus-
band, but that does not authorize the husband nor 
the 'vife to confiscate the- property of the other 
spouse. So far as nppears, Josie never at any 
time authorized her husband to convey away or 
pledge her property for the debts of her husband. 
The mere fact that J. Harold Giles ran the farm 
and sheep belonging to Josie does not justify or 
even tend to justify the conclusion that he had a 
right to take Josie's stock to the bank and use the 
same to secure his not.P. Nor is there any evi-
clnnrP jn this record ,.vhich sho,Ys or tends to sho'v 
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that Josie Baird Giles received any consid~ration 
for her interest in the stock certificate; nor that 
~he received any of the money derived from the 
notes \vhich Harold signed at the bank. On the 
contrary, she loaned to her husband, J. "Harold 
Giles, the sum :of Twenty-five Hundred D·ollars, no 
part of which was. ever repaid to ·her. Nor is there 
anv evidenc~ which sho"\.YS or tends to show that 
J o~ie was guilty of any laches in asserting her right 
or that the Bank of Heber City \vas n1isled by any .. 
thing which J os.ie did or failed to do with respect 
to the notes of her husband. It further is made 
to appea.r, without conflict, that no renewal note 
was executed after Josie learned tha.t her then hus-
band had hypothecated the certifica.te8 of stock .. 
rhe trial court's finding No. 24, A b. 94 and 95, 
seems to squint at the notion that Josie Baird Giles 
was and that .J. Rulon Morgan as executor of the 
last will and testament of Elizabeth J, Baird is 
estopped from questioning the claimed lien on the 
stock certificates. It is., to r"sa.y the least, extremely 
doubtful if the findings made by the court bPlow 
are sufficient to support the conclusion of law and 
decree to the effect that the Bank of Heber City 
acquired a lien on the. stock to secure the SeventP.en 
Hundred Dollar note executed by J. Harold Giles 
at the time the stock certjficates were delivered to 
the bank. much less tho Twenty-five Hundred Dol-
lar note sued upon in caRe No. 1266 Civil. 
lt is the uniform holding of the authorities that 
one who relies upon an estoppel must plead and 
prove the facts so relied upon. In this case the 
bank and its representatives do not plead an 
estop.pel and offer no proof in support tlu~roof, ex-
cept that J. :Harold Giles tended to the business of 
,Josie. Apparently attending to her business mean~ 
that he ran the farm and the sheep helonging to 
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.Josie. That an estoppel n1ust be pleaded and proven 
has been the repeated holding of this Court .. 
Bero'v v. Shields, 48 Utah 2/0; 159 P. 53B. 
Cole v. Sugar Company, 35 Utah 148; 9~ 
P. 681. 
The essential elements of equitable estoppel as re-
lating to the party estopped a.re : 
''1. Conduct which amounts to a false 
representation or concealment of material 
facts, or at least which is calculated to 
convey the impression that the facts are 
otherwise than and inconsistent with those 
which the party subsequently atten1pts to 
assert. 
2. Intention or at least expectation that 
such conduct shall be acted upon by the 
other party. 
3. Kno"rledge, actual or constructive of 
the real facts.'' 
As relating to the party claiming the estoppel they 
are: 
'·1. The lack of knowledg·e and of the 
means of knowledge of the truth as to the 
facts in question. 
2. Reliance upon the conduct of the party 
estopped. 
3. Action based thereon of such a char-
acter as to change his position prejudi-
cially." 
19 American Jurisprudence, Pages 642-643. 
The evidence in this case does not show the pres-
ence of any one of those elements above enun1er-
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a ted as to any estoppel of either Josie Baird Giles 
or her successor in interest, J. Rulon Morgan as 
executor of the Last ·Will and Testament of Eliz-
abeth J. Baird, nor is the Bank of IIeber City, nor 
1ts success,or in a position to evoke estoppel be .. 
cause, as heretofore pointed out, it cannot be heard 
to say that it did not know the stock belongred to 
Josie Baird Giles, nor did Josie Baird Giles do 
anything which was calculated to mislead the bank. 
Nor is there any pleading or evidence which sup-
ports or tends to support a clain1 that J os.ie Baird 
Giles or her successor in interest has waived her 
right to the stock freed from any claim of the bank, 
or that either of them have ratified the acts of 
J. Harold Giles in hypothecating the stock cer-
tificates. 
Even though it should be conceded, contrary to all 
the evidence, that Josie Baird Giles consented to 
the hypothecation of her stock in 1929 as security 
for the Seventeen Hvndred Dollar note then ex-
ecuted by J. Harold Giles, still such fact would not 
support the claim of the Bank of Heber Uity and 
its succe-ssurs that the certificates may be held as 
security for the note sued upon in Cause No. 1266 
Civil. It is elementary that a surety may not be held 
on an obligation to vvhieh he has not consented to 
be surety. In this· case all of the original obliga-
tion was paid off except possibly the 811111. of rrwo 
Hundred Dollars. The time for paying the indebt-
edness of J. Harold Giles to the hank "\Vas extended 
many _times. Such is the evidence and such is the 
finding of the court below. ( Testiinony of Riley 
C. Draper, Tr. 200-201 ~ A b. 254; Finding No. 21, 
Ab. 94). There is a complete lack of evidence tend-
ing to show that Josie Baird Giles cons en ted that 
the certificates of stock might be hP1d by the ba11k 
as security for the paymPnt of any rene,val or any 
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notes of J. Harold Giles. The law applicable to 
this phase of the case is thus stated in 
21 R. C. L. 1004: 
'~It is fundamental that any a.gree1nent ot 
dealing bet\veen the creditor and the pril.~­
cipal in an obligation or debt which essen-
tially varies the terms of the contract with-
out the consent of the surety will release 
the surety frorn liability.'' 
In the same volume at Pa.ge 1018 it is said: 
"It is a familiar rule that if a creditor, by 
positive contract, with the princip~al debtor 
and without the consent of the surety, ex-
tends the time of payment he thereby dis-
charges the surety. '' 
Numerous cases are cited in support of the fore-
going text, but the la'v as therein stated is so 
familiar that we refrain from citing further 
authorities. 
ELIZABETII J. BAIRD, HAVING PURCHASED 
THE STOCK CER'riFICATES BECAUSE 
THE ASSESSMENTS THEREON HAD NOT 
BEEN PAID, IS THE O·WNER OF THE 
CERTIFICATES. 
By thPir ass.ignments appellants attack the finding 
of the trial court to the eff{_)ct that Elizabeth J. 
Baird did not purchase and \Vas not the o'vner of 
r.ertifieates numbered 64 and 68. Touching the 
assessments levied against those certificates the 
evidence shows : On February 7, 19~13, an aS'sess-
ffiE;\nt of Three Dollarg per share was levied upon 
all the primary stock of the Lake Creek .Irrigation 
Company. Notice of the asAessment was sent to the 
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stockholders and published in the ·Wasatch V\"" ave. 
(Tr. 302-304; Ab. 177-178). The stock upon \Vhich 
the assessment was not paid was bought in by the 
Lake Creek Irrigation Company and by action of 
the Board of Directors the stockholders whose 
stock "\\ras sold were given until O·ctober 1, __ 1933 to 
redeem the stock. (Tr. 304-305; Ab. 178-179). 
The secretary of the company was authorized to see 
if the Bank of Heber City would 1·edeem the stock 
of Josie Baird Giles (Smith). (Tr. 306; Ab.179). 
The bank was notified of the assessment but did 
not pay the same. ( Tr. 318; A h. 185). Under date 
of February 7, 1934, Mrs. James R. Baird, who is 
one and the same person as Elizabeth J. Baird, paid 
the amount owing upon the stock of Josie Baird 
Giles (Smith). (Tr. 307; Ab. 180-181). The only 
reason a ne\v certificate was not issued to Elizabeth 
J. Baird ~as because the old certificates \vere not 
surrendered to the company. (Tr. 311-313; l\h. 1~2-
183). While the records of the I.Jake Creek Irriga-
tion Company are not as complete as n1ight be de-
sired, s.till such records do sho"r that a subPtantial 
compliance with the laws of this State relating to 
the levy and collection of assessments \vas. duly 
ma.de. Any unceTtainty in the re-cords as to a 
complianc~ with the law is made certain by the orfll 
testin1ony of J. Thomas Crook, president of the 
l.Jake Creek Irrigation Co1npany. (Tr. ;-300-320 and 
B27; Ab. 176-185). \Vhen a stockholder is given 
personal notice of an assessment there is no neces-
sity of giving any other notice. 
Witcomb v. Geannini, 43 Cal. App. 2'27; 184 
P. 881. 
Lexington & W. C. R. Co. v. Chandler, 13 
Mete. (Mass.) 311. 
In this case the L.ake Creek Irrigation Co1npa.ny 
was not required to give the Bank of HeheT City 
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notice because it "ras not a record owner of the 
stock and in nny event the bank may not at this late 
date be heard to con1plain of any irreg;ul~rities in 
the making of the assessment or in advertising the 
stock for sale. 
Hatch v. Lucky Bell Min. Co., 25 Utah 405; 
71 P. 865. 
In this connection it may be observed that an irrigar-
tion co~pany such as the Lake Creek Irrigation 
Company is not required to publish notice of assess-
me-nts. ' 
R. S. U. 1933, 18-4-10. 
If the stock was lawfull)r sold because of the non-
payment of assessment, it follows that the claimed 
lien of the bank has ceased to exist. 
Fletchers Cyclopedia of Corporations, Vol. 
. 4, Page 595, Section, 1866. 
Thus, in any event, any lien that the Bank of Heber 
City may .have had on the water stock represented 
by the certificates numbered 64 and 68 must give 
way to the rights of Elizabeth 'J. Baird. 
ARGill1:ENT TOUCHING THE CLAIM OF '_rHE 
MOU.LTONS TO THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
DO.LLAR:NOTE AND J\10RTGAGE ON THE 
L1\ND AND W A'l'ER TO SECURE TH;E 
PAYMENT THEREOF. 
As one of the defenses to the suit brought by the 
MrJultons in Civil Case No. 1410 the appellants 
~laim that before the Moultons atten1pted to levy 
on the note in question Josie Baird Giles (Smith) 
and V ~rnor E. Baird had agreed to cancel the tran-
~action and had further agreed that the property 
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covered by the deed and mortg:age should be con-
veyed to Elizabeth J~ Baird in payment of the debt 
which Josie Baird Giles~ (Smith) o"\\red to her 
mother, Elizabeth J. Baird. This being an equity 
suit, appellants are entitled to have this (Jonrt re-
view the evidence and pass upon the weight there-
of. In a number of the assignments of error appel-
lants have attacked the findings of the trial court 
to the effect that no such agreement was entered 
into: Assignments Numbered 12, 13, 14, 21, 23, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 3'5} 36, 37, 41 and 45 
By a~signments numbered 48, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 
appellants attack the conclusions of law \Vhich arP 
to thP effect that the ~{oultons are the owners of 
the note and have a lien on the land and water 
stock as security for the payment of the note. For 
similar reasons appellants by assignment No. 54 
attack the decree. A substantial portion of thP 
evidencP before the trial court, either directly or 
indirectly touches the question of 'vhether or not 
the agreement had between ,Josie Baird Gil~~ 
(Smith) ·and Vernor E. Baird for the sale and pur-
ehase of tlu~ land and water stock was by mutual 
agreement bP.tween .Josie and Vern or cancelled 
One ~of the questions \Yhich 'Ye deem of controlling 
importancP iR whether or not the 'evidence i~ such 
as require~ a finding that such agre·ement \Yas en-
tered in tn before the attemnt \vas made to a tta.ch 
..1._ 
the' note. Whille e~idence \vas offered touching 
.the question of \vhether Josie owed her mother any 
tnoney, and if so, the amount thereof, sur.b ques .. 
tion is not in our view of controlling importance. 
That is to say, if Josie "\\Tas without right to en-
force p,ayment of the note against Vernor at the 
time the Moultons attempted to attach the note, 
then. and in ~uch case, the M.oultons cannot prevail 
in 'their suit on the note. Such is the law indepen-
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dent of statute and such is the express provision of 
our statute. 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-27. 
If Josie. could not .enforce the fifteen thousand 
dollar note again~t \r ernor, the same may not be 
enforced by the Moultons. The Moultons· have not 
levied an attachment or execution on the land aud 
\Vater stock covered by the mortgage, but only upon 
the note. If the i\Ioultons have any claiin against 
the land or "rater stock it must he because they 
acquired title to the note pursuant to the attach-
ment execution. V\Thile the appellants. offered evi-
dence as to the circumstances under which Eliz ... 
abeth J. Baird acquired the land and water stock, 
such evidence was offered becaus~ the transaction 
whereby Mrs. Baird acquired the land and water 
was inseparably connected with and in a s.ense was 
a part of the transaction whereby Josie released 
Vernor from an obligation to pay the not.P. 
It is difficult in a brief, without repeating~ the en-
tire testimony} to give a reviewing court a word 
picture of all of the evidence. We shall~ howevf\r. 
direct the Cnnrt's _attention to those portions of 
the evidence which in our view clearly show 'vhere-
in th~ truth lies: On October 10, 1929, Josie, who 
w·as then the owner of a tract of ·'land and a water 
right u~ed to irrigate the land, conveyed the same 
to her brother Vernor. Some of the water right 
was represented by t\vo eertifica.tes of capital 
~toek in the Lake Creek Irrigation Con1-pa.ny. The 
certificates are numbered 64 and 68. Other water 
appears to have been appurtenant to the land. 
Nothing was paid on the purchase price of the- land 
and water at the time of the transaction, but Ver-
nor and hiR 'vife Mary executed a. note for the prin-
eipal ~urn of Fifteen Thousand Dollars, payable 
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on or he.fore ten years after date. To secure the 
payment of the note a mortga.ge was executed by 
Vernor and his \vife Mary. (Ab .. 82 to 84). By the 
terms of the mortgage on the land and water 'it is 
alleged that 
''This mortgage is given collaterally with 
a chattel mortgage of even date herewith 
1nad,l hy the nlol'tgagors in favor oi the 
mortgagee to secure the payment of one 
certain promissory note.'' etc. (.Ab. 36). 
The deed executed by .Josie, the note and Invrt-
gage e-xecuted by V ~rnor and his wife. and a chat-
tel · mortg·age were .all made out by George B. 
Stanley. The deed and mortgage were ackno·wl-
edged by :him as a notary. The deed and real 
estate mortgage· "\\7ere delivered to Vernor. Th8 
note was left with and retained by George B. 
Stanley until he delivered the same to the Sheriff 
of \V asatch Connty at the time George B. Stanley 
brought ~.uit fo1· the Moultons.. The chattel mort-
gage vvns never completed but \Vas retained by Mr. 
Stanley. Thus, Josie did not pQrsonally receive 
either the note, the real estate mortgage or the 
chattel mortgage. (Testi~ony of Josie Baird Gile~ 
(Smith), (Tr. 64-72; Ab. 125-127: Tr. 82-83; Ab. 
129; testimony of George B. Stanley, Tr. 405-41~, 
Ab. 210-211). Josie's testimony on both direct and 
cross examination· is to tlH~ effect that Vernor was 
unable to p~ay the note. That he paid only ten dol~ 
lars thereon; that at one time hP gave her a check 
but the s.ame wa.s returned because of insufficient 
funds {Exhibit B). That sh~ went with Vernor to 
Salt Lake to s.ee what could he done about making 
payment. That he waR unable to secure any money. 
(Tr. 66-72, Ab. 126-127; Tr. 79, Ab. 128-129; rrr. 
92-94; A b. 132; Tr. 105, ._t\_b. 135). The testimony 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
of '':illiam H. Baird is to the san1e eifect (Tr. 144-
147; Ab. 143). It is also the testin1ony of V' ernor 
E .. Baird, ( Tr. 360 to 363, A b. 1~9; 'l,r. 3oi·, Ab. 
200). It also appears fron1 the records of the Lake 
Creek Irrigation Company and the tes.tin1ony of its 
president that the assessinent levied upon the wa.te1· 
stock in 1933 "~as thereafter p~aid by Elizabeth J. 
Baird. (Tr. 306-309, Ab. 180-181; '11r. 311-312:; A h. 
182, 183). 
According to the testimony of George B. Stanley, 
Josie failed to call for the note until after it was 
attached, notwithstanding he, Stanley, informed 
her that he would levy on the note for the Moul· 
tons if she did not con1e and get it. ( Tr. 412; A b. 
211). There is no evidence to the contrary. It 
does appear that Vernor signed a blank applica-
tion for a loan with the Wasatch Livestock Loan 
Company, in \vhich app,lication the note, listed as a 
liability, was filled in by an employee of the loan 
company. (Exhibits 14 and 15, dated November 
3, 1933 and October 24, 1934, respectively). Neither 
of these exhibits were filled out when signed, and 
J. Clyde Mitchell, a witness called by thP J\tloul-
tons, testified that the Wasatch Livestock LQRn 
Company kne'v that Vernor did not claim ti.tle to 
the farm at the time the application 'vas. made. 
Thus, the testimony of Mr. Mitchell in no way im--
peaches but corroborates the testimony of Vernor 
to the effect that the note was regarded as can-
celled and the only reason that it was not returne·d 
to Vernor is because it was held by Mr. Stanley .. 
It will also be noted that in the affidavit for a writ 
of attachment in Case No. 1261, Plaintiffs' Exbib.it 
1, madP by the Moultons. under date of June 21, 
1934, before George B. Stanley, notary public'! it 
is averred that the defelldants are endeavoring to 
conceal their property and that plaintiffs arEl 
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apprehensive that unless a writ of attachment is 
issued, the defendants will dispose of or conceal 
their property. The only property that Josie 
owned was the fifteen thousand dollar note and 
mortgage, excepting the note signed by her hus-
band, J. Harold Giles, for the sum of Twenty-five 
Hundred Dollars. Obviously if .Josie should con-
ceal or sell the note of J. Harold Giles, such con-
cealment or sale would not _prevent the Moultons 
from collecting on the notes signed by Josie and 
J. Harold Giles. If Josie was attempting to dis-
pose of her property as alleged in the affidavit, it 
must have been the fifteen thousand note because 
she owned no other property and had no Income 
excepting what her mother gave her. (Tr. 128; 
A b. 140; Finding No. 28; A h. 9'7). 
As heretofore indicated the question of whetl1er 
or not Josie "\vas indebted to her mother is not of 
controlling; importance, for the reason that any 
elaim that the Moultons have is founded upon the 
note and that alone. If Josie had no right to sue 
Vernor and his wife on the not~, the }.r!oultons have 
no such right because, as we have pointed out, the 
Moultons, by the proceedings had, could at mo.st 
acquire only such right as Josie had. Howevef. 
the question of whether Josie owed her mother any 
money may bear indirectly on thp principal ques-
tion. The evidence on this phase of the case is lik~­
\vis.e all to the effect that Josie did owe her n1otlier 
about six thousand dollars at the time Vernor con-
veyed the real estate and water covered by the 
mortgagp to ~his mother. Josie testified tha.t at 
the time- her father's estate was s.ettled she re-
ceived more than her share of the estate r'nd that 
she gave her mother a note for thirty-five hundred 
dollars, and that her mother furnished Josie with 
the money for the support and maintenance of 
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herself and the n1inor child. (Tr. 76, 79, 85, 93, 94 
and 99; Ab. 128, 130, 132 and 134). Such is also 
the testimony of ·vvm. H. Baird (Tr. 143, 162; Ab. 
143-146). That Josie received money for her own 
support and for the support of her minor child is 
established beyond any question of a doubt. J .. 
Harold Giles did not give Josie any money for 
her support or the support of her minor child after 
the spring of 1930. (Tr. 167; Ab. lj"O). 
Jo;;:ie expected and agreed to p:1y her mother 
from the money "Thieh Vernor was to pay 
J o::-:ie; but only ten dollars \vas ever pa1d by \r er-
nor on the not~ and mortgage. On July 9, 1934 
Josie brought an action in the District c;ourt of 
Wasatch County for a divorce from J. Harold 
Giles. The ground for the divorce 'vas the failure 
and refus.al of the defendant to provide plaintiff 
with the common necessities of life. In the com-
plaint and the findings of the court it \\as alleged 
and found that defendant .J. Harold Giles had 
" failed to provide Josie Baird Giles with the eom-
mon necessities of life and that the p~laintiff Josie 
'11ad no meanR or money "\vith V\rhich to pay the clerk 
thA filing fee or the officerR for serving proceBs. 
(Files in Case 1256, which were admitted in evi-
dence and are all part of the record on appea 1). 
It "rill be noted that the divorce action "Tas filed 
nearly a month before the sheriff served the writ 
of attachment. 
Some of' the files in the probate p~roc€ec1ings of thP 
eRtate of James R. Baird, deceased, father of 
Josie, 'vere received in evidence. (ExhiEit No. 8). 
It will probably be contended that these files tend 
to impeach the testimony of J o~ie and her bro-
ther~ V 0rnor and \~Villiam. There is., however, 
nothing in such file which in any manner eonflicts 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
with the testimony of) ~ither ~11liam, "Jo13ie or 
Vernor. It was made to appear that Elizabeth J. 
Baird, the mother advanced some money to the 
' estate of James R. Baird, deceased, to pay the ex-
penses of the administration. In order to balance 
the account in the probate proceedings it was nP-Cef~ .. 
sary to make provisions for reimbursing Mrs. 
Baird for the money so advanced. This. was done 
by a number of the children giving Mrs. Baird 
notes. Such transaction does, not in any way tend 
to show that Josie did not, as both she-. and. "\~lilliam 
testified, receive more than her share of the estate 
and that she gave her note to her mother for 
Thirty-five Hundred D·ollars. If Mrs. Baird sold 
to Josie a part of the property \vhich Mrs. Baird 
was entitled to, there ''ras no occa.sicn for such a 
transaction to appear in the probate proceedings. 
That Josie did receive more than her share and 
that she gaYP h(lr note therefor, is established 
without any conflict in the evidence. (Testimony 
of Josie, Tr. 73-76, Ab. 128-12.9; Tr. 85 to ;88. Ab. 
130-131; testimony of ·Wm. H. Baird, Tr. 44, Ah. 
143). That Elizabeth J. Baird advanced money 
for the support of Josie and her child is established 
without doubt. Not only is there no evidence to 
the contrary, but the surrounding circumstances 
show that such must have been the fact. 
Josie and her child of necess1 ty. required money for 
food, shelter and clothing. All of Josie's property 
\Va.s tied up in the note V\rhich Vern or and his wife 
gave her, but upon which only ten dollars was,paid, 
and the note of her husband, J. Harold Giles, for 
Twenty-five Hundred Dollars upon 'vhich nothing 
was paid. Josie's husband provided nothing- foT" 
her support after the spring of 1930, and because 
of such failure Josie filed suit for divorce in 1934. 
Josie received nothing "rhen she signed the note~ 
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sued upon _by the ~Ioultons in the action "'here an 
attempt 'vas made to levy upon and sell tho fifteen 
thousand dollar note. (Tr. 1~3; Ah. 139). ~,he 
1\loultons make no claim to the contrary. In her 
testimony on both direct and cross exa1nina tion 
Josie testified as to the money she received from 
her mother. There i~ not the slightest reason to 
disbelieve the same. It also appearR that the Moul-
tons _paid only one hundred dollars for the fifteen 
thousand dollar note, \vhich would seem to indicate 
that even the Moultons knew or believed that the-
note \Ya.s of little or no value. It \Vould p·robably 
serve no us.eful purpose to here repeat all of that 
testimony. Doubtless, the members of the Court 
will read the same. ,,~e earnestly urge that ~uch 
testimony be read 1and feel confident that \vhen the 
same is reviewed the members of the Court will be 
convinced that Josie spoke the truth \Yhen she tes-
tified that in 1933 she owed her mother about six 
thousand dollars. The court beloW1 committed 
grievous error \Vhen it held that she \vas not in-
debted to her mother, Elizabeth J. Baird. 
We. have already directed the Court's attention to 
the evi4ence touching the agreement between Josie 
and Vern or to cancel the note, but before leavn1g 
this phase of the cas.e we "'~ish to call attention to 
circumstances independent of direct evidence which 
point unerringly to appellants' contention that 
Josie and Vern or had ag'reed that the note should 
be cancelled and the only reason that it \Ya8 not 
returned to Vernor 'vas because it \vas held by ~Ir. 
Stanley, who, shortly after S osiP brought the 
divorce action against her hus.band, J. Ha.rold 
Giles, conceived of the idea that it was high tin1e 
to levy on the fifteen thousand dollar note if h~ 
'vns to hP able to satisfy the clajm of his ne"v ly 
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acquired clients, the · Moultons, and incidentally 
enable him to secure an attorney's fee of three hun-
dred seventy dollars. lVlr. Stanley testified that 
he pTepared the deed from Josie to Vern or for the 
fiffteen thousand note, the real estate mortgage 
to secure the pote and a chattel mortgage, ·w·hich 
had never been completed. Mr. Stanley further 
testified that neither Josie uor V erHoJ.· L~·.-er calJed 
for the note and that he told Josie that he was go .. 
ing to levy on the note for the Moultons at least on 
three occasions and still Josie did not make any 
attempt to get the note until after it was dehvered 
to the sheriff~ 
Here was a note rep,resenting a small fortune, at 
least to one reared in the country as ·\\ra~ Josie, 
and yet, if Mr. Stanley is to he believed, she did 
not consider the note of sufficient importance to 
even a§k for the s.ame, and that notwithstanding, 
she was told at least three times that if she did 
not call for the note it would be disposed of for 
whatever the Moultons were \villing to pay on the 
notes which they held against Josie. and her hus-
band. Such behavior on the part of Josie is so con-
trary to human experience that even if the obliga-
tion on the note had in fact been eancelled by rea-
son of the agreement between Vernor and Josie, 
it is most improbable that l\1:r. Stanley's testimony 
in such particular is true. If the note in fact hall 
not be-en cancelled s.uch conduct on the part of 
Josie is almost beyond belief. The evidence snows. 
and this Court \viii take judicial notice of the fa.ct. 
that about the time Josie and Vernor entered into 
the contract for the/ sale and purchase of the farm 
and \vater stock the price of farm produce and live-
stock began to decline in value and that by 1932 
and 1933 farmers and livestock owners were unable 
to pay the running expenses of their husiness, much 
less pay interest and princip~al on a fifteen thousand 
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dollar note. In this rase it also appears tha.t 
Vernor owed a substantial sum to the \Va.satch 
Livestock Loan Company. 
\Vhen Josie brought the action for divorce she 'vas 
without funds to pay the filing fee and cost of 
serving process. _ If the fifteen thousand dollar 
note was at that time a subsisting oblig~ation it is 
indeed difficult to believe that her brother Vernor 
would not have advanced her sufficient money t.o 
bring th~ divorce action or that she would be so 
forgetful of the truth as to verify a complaint 
wherein it is alleged she was without money with 
which to bring the divorce action. Under these 
facts and circumstances what ".,.as more natural 
than that Josie should conclude that Vern or could 
not possibly pay the note and that to save the ex-
pense of foreclosure the note should be cancelled, 
w·hich, 25 the evidence offered by the appellants 
shows~ was done. It is also significant that soon 
after the evidence shows the agreement was entered 
into between Vernor and Josie and 1\frR. Baird, 
the latter arranged to and did pay the assessment 
on the certificates of stock "'rhich represented the 
water used to jrrigate the land covered by the rnort-
gage. If the trial court's findings are to be sus-
tained it was Vernor's obligation to pay the water 
assessments. but there is nothing which sllo,vs ur 
tends to show that Vernor concerned hims.elf about 
the water assessments. 
It also appears ·that Vernor did not retain posses-
sion of the farm after the year 1933. ( Tr. 362-363 ; 
A b. 199). Moreover, if the trial court's finding 
with respect to the lien of the. Heber City Bank is 
to be sustained, Vern or had a right to rescind the 
contract of purchase and repudiate the note as to 
Josie, and likewise as to the Moultons, who in any 
ovent acquired no gTrater right than Josie ha.d at 
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the time of the levy. If Josie in fact hypothecated 
the 'vater stock which was used to irrigate the land 
to pay all pres.ent and future obligations of J. 
Harold Giles, such action by Josie constituted a 
breach of the covenant of the deed to Vernor and 
gave the latter, upon a discovery of the breach, 
a right to rescind the note up·on reconveying the 
land and water to .Josie or her nominee, i~lrs. Baird, 
just as was done. 
An attempt 'vas made· to hnpeach Wm.,H. Baird 
by Mr. Stanley as to what wa~ said by ~iilham 
before the County Commissioners. (Testimony of 
Wm. H. Baird~ Tr. 170, Ab. 147; testimony of 
George B. Stanley, Tr. 404, Ab. 208). It is, to say 
thP h~ast, ::;.trange that if the statements tes,tified to 
by Mr. Stanley occurred before the nu1nerous ·wit-
nesses that he claims were present, none of those 
'\Vitne~ses 'vere called to corroborate what Mr. 
Stanley cla.ims to. be the far.t. In any event, the 
attempt to impeach 'V"m. H. Baird is 'vithout value. 
No one claims that any consideration passed from 
V E:'rnor to ~Mrs,. Baird at the time the land and 
"rater 'vere reconveyed by Vern or to his mother. 
The conveyance was- made to the mother as part 
of the agreement that the· fifteen thousand dollar 
note should be cancelled. If ""\Vm. H. I~aird djcl. 
make the R.tatement that Mrs. Baird did not pay 
Vernor anything for the deed, such statement, if 
made, in no 'vay tends to r."nt.ra.dict the facts aR 
testified to by appellants' -witnesses .. 
We have- thus briefly summarized the· evidencA 
touching appellants' claim that by agreement the 
fifteen thousand dollar note was cancelled; long he-
fore it was levied upon and that the eourt below 
\vas in error in its finding and conclusion to the 
effect that the note was a subsisting obligation 
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pwing by \:--ernor E. Baird and his \Yife ~fa.ry at the 
time :J[r. Stanley turned the note oYer to the sher-
iff of \V-asatch County. The action of the Maul-
tons being, as it is, founded on the fifteen thousand 
dollar note, such note Innst be a binding obliga,tion, 
as otherwise the action of the Moultons must fail. 
If the note was cancelled before the t:an1e was de-
livered to the sheriff of 1Vasatch County, there is 
nothing upon which an action can be founded. 
THE PRETENDED LEVY ON THE FIFTEEN 
THOUSAND DOI .. I_JAR NOTE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES DISCLOSED BY THIS 
RECORD PR-ECI.JUDES THE MOUL1'0NS 
FROi\I CLAil\liNG TITL.E TO THE NOTE. 
We have already directed the attention of the 
Court to the evidence which shows that G.eorge B .. 
Stanley prepared the de~d from Josie to Vern or, 
the fifteen thousand dollar note and the real 
estate mortgage to secure the same, and a chattel 
mortgage which was never executed. The deed and 
real estate mortg·age " 7ere delivered to Vern or and 
the note sued upon in this action was rAtained by 
!\f r. Stanlev until it 'vas delivered to the sheriff of 
. . 
\V. a.satch County under the pretense that the sheriff 
\vas attaching the same. Both the sheriff and Mr. 
Stanley, somewhat !eluctantly, admitted such to he 
the fact. (See testimony of Virgil Fraughton, Tr. 
J 56, A b. 115; testimony of lV[r. Stanley, Tr. 414, 
.Ab. 212). Mr. Stanley further testified that he 
was not an attorney at all when he made out the 
deed, note, real estate and chattel mortgages; that 
he 'vas admitted to practie~ in 1\{ay, 1931, and that 
h0 had never been the attorney for .Josie Baird 
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Giles (Smith). (Trn 400; Ab. 206). Mr. Stanley 
further testified that he ma.de the papers out at the 
request of Vernor and that he was to deliver the 
note to Josie. ('rr. 410-411; Ab. 211). 
It is provided by the statutory law of this State 
that: 
"It is the duty of an attorney and coun-
sel . . . . 
5. Tol maintain inviolate the confidence 
and at every peril to hims.elf to preserv~ 
secrets of his client: . . . . 
9, To comply with all duly approved rules 
and regulations prescribed by the board of 
commissionerR of the Utah State Bar and 
to pay the fees provided by law " 
R. S. U. 1933, 6-0-25 
''An attorney and counselor who receives 
n1oney or property of his client in the 
course of his professional busineBs and "\\7ho 
refuses to vav or deliver the same to the 
person enti tied thereto within a reason,.., 
able time after demand i~ guilty of a nus-
demeanor'' 
R. S. U. 1933. 6-0-41 
The rules of the Utah Bar providP: 
"Rule 6, I)aragraph 3 thereof: The obli-
gation to represent the client with un-
divided fidelity and not to divulge his 
secrets or confidence. and forbid also thP 
subsequent acceptance of retainers or ein-
ployment from others in matters adverRP ... 
ly affecting any interest of the client with 
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1·espect to which confidence has bP.en re .. 
posed.'' 
''Rule 57, The duty to preserve Iris client's 
confidence outlives th~ la\vye-r's employ-
ment. etc .. ' ' 
It is suggested that because Mr. Stanley "\Vas not an 
attorney at the time he made out the documents 
for \'ernor and Josie be should not be held to the 
code prescribed for attQrneys. That the work of 
preparing the -documents for Josie and Vernor was 
practicing· la"\v is, so far as we are advised, sup-
ported by all the authorities. 
People v. Title Guaranty Trust Co1npany, 
230 N. Y. 578. 
Judd v. The City rrrust & Savings Bank, 
1B3 Ohio St. 81; 12 N. E. ( 2d) ,28R~ 
People v. Weil, 260 N. Y. S. 65ft 
It would be strange indeed to say that one who un-
lawfully practice-s law may disregard the rules 
applicable to one who is entitled to practice. The 
authorities teach that the law does. not so favor one 
\vho is not admitted to practice. Any other rule 
\vould reward rather than punish one engaged in 
the unlawful practice of law. 
Moreover, the work which Mr. Stanley undertook 
before he was admitted to practice was never com-
pleted. He testified that he undertook to completA 
the transaction by prep~aring the chattel mortga.a:P 
and to deliver the note to Josie. He never did 
either. He was an attorney when he delivered the 
note to the sheriff in furtherance of the scheme to 
make Vernor pay the note in full and to deprive 
Josie of any interes.t she might have had in the 
note. In doing so he used the knowledge and con-
fir10TIC1P reposed in him by Vernor and .} osie in an 
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attempt to benefit himself and his newly acquired 
elients, the 1\Ioultons. Such attempts are uniform-
ly condemned by the courts, and an attachment or 
execution levied under such or si1nilar circum-
stances are to he held void and of no effect what-
ever. The. law is thus stated in 
7 c. J. s.! 415: 
"It may be stated as a general rule that 
when a levy is effected by any imprope:r· 
means as for instance by the use of any 
fraudulent device to obtain possessior1 of 
property it will be invalid '' 
rro the same effect is the law s.tated in 
6 0. J. 245, Section 469. 
A. number of cases will be found in the footnote 
to the text in 
Note 17 in C. J., Page 245. 
The same rule applies to execution. A levy which 
is procured through fraud, trickery or trespass is 
invalid. When the officer or creditor or other per .. 
son repres.enting the creditor fraudulently o1· 
wrongfully acquires possession of property for the 
purpose of levying on it, or where the property i~ 
brought vvithin the jurisdiction of a court for the 
purpose of being leviecl on through any frand o,~ 
other 'vrongful act, the courts. uniformly strikP 
down a sale had under such circumstanees. 
23 C. ,T~ 432 and cases there cited .. 
'rhat Mr. Stanley, in wilfully turning the fifteen 
thousand dollar note to the sheriff, used the knowL 
edge he acquired while actjng for J-asie and \Tf~rnor, 
cannot admit of doubt. That he wrongfully de-
livered the note to thP sheriff~ entrusted to him 
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to be delivered to Josie, is equally clear. lie seeks 
to justify his "Tongful act in such re~.pect by the 
claim that he warned Josie he was going to do the 
wrongful act at leas.t three tin1es before he did it. 
He does not claim, ho,vever, that either Josie or 
Vernor authorized him to deliver the note to the 
sheriff so that the sheriff could sell it for what-
ever the Moultons were willing to pay - in this 
case the sum of one hundred dollar.s. 
The courts of this !lnd other States have gone a 
long1 way in requiring that attorneys exercise the 
utmost good faith tovva.rds their clients.~ Public 
policy require~ that those standards be not relaxed. 
If in this case the action of lVIr. Stanley in turning 
the fifteen thousand dollar note over to the sheriff, 
which he was obligated to deliver to Josie, under 
the pretext that th~ same vvas attached .and sold 
under execution for the sum of one hundred dol-
Lars shall be approved, then indeed 1nay an attor-
ney reap a handsome revvard for hin1self and one 
of his clients, at the expense of another client. The 
law does not permit an attorney nor his client to 
collect an o1Jligation, no matter ho"\v valid the claim 
may be, by such procedure. As appears from the 
authorities heretofore cited, a valid levy upon 
property by either attachment or under execution 
must he free from the taint of fraud, trickery or un-
lawfulness before any rights may be acquired as 
result of a levy and sale. 
The Moultons claim and the court below found that 
George B. Stanley did not have possession of said 
note as the attorney for Vernor E. Baird, Mary .1\ .. 
Baird or Josie Baird Giles (Sn1ith), or for any of 
the defendants; that George B. Stanley at no tin1e 
has been or acted as attorney for .Josie Baird Giles 
(Smith). (Finding No. 14; Ah. 88). We have 
attacked that finding. If, as the court found, ~fr. 
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Stanley did not have possession of the note for 
either Josie or Vern or, we are at a loss to conceive 
from this record for whom he s~ecured and re-
tained possession of the note. ~Ir. Stanley appar· 
ently had no doubt about the fact that he held the 
note for Josie. He testified that at least three 
times he told ,Josie to come and get the note. If, a.s 
the court found, 1\Ir. Stanley was not holding, the 
note as Josie's ag:ent, then, and in such case, the 
note was never delivered. Josie could not main-
tain an aetion on a note which had never been de-
livered to her, and by the same token the Moultons 
may not maintain an action on the note, because 
they acquired no greater right than Josie had at 
the time of the levy. An undelivered note is. not 
subject to he levied upon by attachment or writ of 
execution. 
Erskine v. Nimours Trading Corp., 239 
N. Y. 32; 149 N. E. 273. 
l)os Passos v. Martin, 21.8 N. Y. 517. 
Steese v. Steese, 251 N. Y. S. 164 
THE AFFIDAVIT FOR THE W R. IT 0 F 
ATTACHl\fENT WAS FATALLY DEFECT-
IVE SO THAT THE CI_JERK ·W A.S WITH-
OUT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A W"'RIT OF 
ATT~~.CHMENT AND THE SHERIF~F WA~ 
\'TJTI-IOlJT A1JTHORITY TO L.E.VY lTPON 
THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOljL.AR 
NOTE. 
An examination of the affjdavit filed by tlie Maul-
tons shows that the same does not comp,Iy with 
the law The grounds and the only grrounds upon 
\vhich the Moultons sought and secured a. y;rit of 
attachment 'vas that: 
''The defendants own or hold an interest 
in real and perRonal prop-erty; that they 
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are endeavoring to conceal, that tho plain--
tiff n1ay not realize upon any judg1nent 
which ma.y be obtained in the ahove en-
titled action and that plaintiffs are appre-
hensive that unless a writ of attachment 
is issued the defendants \Yill dispose of or 
conceal their property; ·that execution on 
any judgment obtained in this action will 
be returned "\vi.thout satisfaction.'' 
It "rill be- observed that nowhere in ,the affidavit is 
there any allegation that the amount or the indebt-
edness claimed as owing to the Moultons is an ob-
ligation over-and above all legal counter-claiJJL.q_ 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-3 requires s·\l·Ch aD 
allegation. 
''·Where the statute requires the affiant 
to show that .defendant is indebted to 
plaintiff in the am~unt specified, or that 
the latter is entitled to recover such an 
amount over and above all legal payments. 
setoffs or counter-claims, compliance with 
this statute is ess.ential to cover jurisdic .. 
tion to issue the writ.'' 
7 c. J. s. 293. 
To the same effect is 
6 C. J., Page 132. 
Numerous cases are cited in the footnotes, partic-
ularly 
Notes 2 ·and 3 to the Text of C. J. 1n 
support thereof. 
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Moreover, the affidavit for the attachment does 
not comply with the requirements of 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1 and 104-18-3, 
in that it does not set fo;rth any of the grounds 
mentioned in 104-18-1 as required by s,ubdivision 
5, 104-18-3. Apparently an attempt was made by 
the affidavit to come under either subdivision 3 
or 6 of R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-1. but the affidavit 
does not comply with either. It is not alleged 
that the defendants, or either of them, have 
assigned, disposed of or concealed or are about to 
assign, dispose of or conceal any of their property 
with intent to defraud their creditors. Ohv1ously 
the defendants had a perfeet right to either con-
ceal or dispose of their property to pay debts owing 
to other creditors, or for any other reason so long 
as such acts 'vere not for the purpose or 'viil1 the 
intent to defraud their creditors. Nor does the 
affidavit bring the Moultons within the provisions 
of Subdivision 6 of R. S. U. 1933. 104-18-1. 
No facts whatever are set forth in the affidavit 
which shows or tends to show that ·the 11oultons 
were justly apprehensive of losing their 'claims un-
less. a 'vrit of attachment issue. Apparently there 
waS' ·a very good reas:On why the affidavit did not 
·so allege,' namely, there -are no facts justifying the 
issuance of an attachment. If the fact be as the 
record shows, that the only property which Josie 
had was thp fifteen thousand dollar note, wnich 
was in the possession of Mr. Stanley and which 
Josie refused to call for, notwithstanding Mr. 
Stanley had told her at least three times to come 
and get the same, there "\Vas no basis, in fa,ct for an 
attachment. 
"\"!Jlere plaintiff is required by statute to 
charge that defendant is acting "\\7ith in-
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tent to defraud his creditors . . . . and 
the nffidaYit fails so to charge, it is in-
sufficient to sustain an attachn1eut. '' 
7 C. J. S., Pag-es ~99 and 300, and cases 
cited in the f ootnotG. 
Where plaintiff is required to show that there is a 
probability of losing his debt, that fact should 
appear by a sufficient allegation. The reasons for 
the apprehension of losing! the debt should be sho,vn 
by a statement of facts upon- \vhich the fe~a.r .of 
loss is based and facts should be .set forth showing 
that the property owned or possessed by defendant 
subject to attachment p.robably will not be avail-· 
able to execution w-hen the judgment is had. 
7 C. J. S. 304, and cases there cited 
Among the cases so cited is one from this juris-
diction: 
Western Auto Comp~any v. Gurnea, 73 
Utah 423. 2'74 P. 862~ 
An affidavit for an attachment must be made in 
compliance with the form and requisites p1·ovided 
by statute and the facts. required to be stated in 
the affidavit must appear therein with the re-
quired p~articularity or the court acquire~ no juri~­
diction to issue the vvri t. 
7 C. J. S., Sections 111 and 112, Pages 
276~ 277. 
Moreover. the bond for the attachment is fatally 
defective in that the bond shows on its face that 
it is not executed on the part of the plaintiff as 
required bv 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-4, 
and is not executed by t\Y'o sureties as required hy 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-18-4 and 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-54-16. 
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While the name of Chas. Anderson is signed on 
the bond, it does not appear in the body of (the bond 
that he obligated himself on the bond, and like-
wise, while. the name of Chas. Anderson is signed 
at the end of the verification, it does not appear 
that he was sworn. In such case the bond was in-
sufficient to justify the issuance of a writ of 
attachment. 
Summerton Livestock Co. v. Early, 111 
S. C. 154; 96 S. E. 518. 
It may here be noted that the words ,., on the part 
of the plaintiff" would see1n to be the equivalent 
of ''by the plaintiff.'' 
THE EXECUTION ISSUED IN CAUSE 1410 
WAS F AT.A .. LLY DEFECITIVE1 1AND COIN-
FERRED NO AUTHORITY ON THE 
SHERIFF OF "\V~J\SJ'-'-TCH COUNTY TO 
SELL THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND l)OL-
LAR NOTE INVOI.JVED IN THIS CON-
TRO·VERSY. 
We have a statute. 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-1, Subdivi~ion 3. 
'vhich provides : 
''If property has been attached in the 
action it (the writ of exeeution) shall rP-.. 
quire the officer to satisfy the same so far 
as may be done out of the attached prop-
erty.'' 
Notwithstanding the sheriff had taken possession 
of the fifteen thousand dollar note under the writ 
of attachment, the execution issued in cause No. 
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1261 did not comply 'vith the mandatory provision~ 
of the la'v above quoted and therefore the sheriff 
was "Without authority to advertise for sale or sell 
the note .. 
Gillman v. Tucker, 59 N. Y. sup·ra 570; 13 
N. Y. S. 804. 
Place v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT NOTICE 0~, 
SALE OF THE NOTE ·wAS EVER POS1,ED 
AS BY LAW REQUIRED. . 
The return of the sheriff on execution i~ a part I of 
the files in Civil Case No. 12.61, 'vhich files were 
offered in evidence by the Moultons and received. 
In that returnf it is recited among other things 
''That the sheriff did on the 21s,t day of 
January, 1935 levy on the property here-
inafter described and noticed the same for 
sale as the law directs anq on the 29th day 
. ' 
of January, 1935 at 9 :30 A. M. of said day 
at the front door of. the court house in 
He-ber City, Wasatch County, Utah, the 
time and place fixed for said sale, I did 
attend and offer for sale at public auction 
for lawful money of the United States thP 
property described as follo,vs.'' 
Then follows a descrip~tion of the fifteen thous-
and dollar note and the mortgage to secure the 
payment thereof, certain interests in \Vater stock, 
a mortgage on water appurtenant to the land; nil 
of "\vhich was sold for one hundred dollars. The 
evidcnRe conclusively Bhows that the only notice 
of sale given by the sheriff "ras a notice, a eopy 
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of which was received in evidence and n1arked as 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4. Another copy is marked 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12. 
It will be noted that by the said notice the sale was 
to be had on January 28, 1935, at 10:00 o'clock, 
A. M. The sheriff proposed to sell the interest of 
the defendants in the fifteen thousand dollar note, 
mortgage given to secure the note, an interest in 
some 'vater stock held by the Bank of Heber City, 
49 shares of the p-rimary stock, 34 shares of first-
class high water right, 23 shares of second-class 
high water right and 8 shares of third-class hig-h 
water rigiht of the L~~e Creek Irrigation Company, 
representing 'vater rig'ht appurtenant to the lands 
deBcribed in the mortgage. We assume that the 
l\ioultons will not claim that under the proceed-
ings had any land, interest in land, water stock or 
water appurtenant to the land "\vas levied upon or 
sold or attemp,ted to be sold hy the sheriff. 
The sheriff was "\vithout authority to s.ell real 
estate pursuant to the notice. No publication wa~ 
had in a newspaper, nor 'vas noticd [posted for 
twenty days as requi.red for the sale of re!al estate. 
R. S. U. 1933, 104-37-18. 
Nor did the sheriff, according to his testimony, 
offer for sal~ or sell anything other than the fif-
teen thousand dollar note. ·1Had ~he, sheriff at-
tempted to sell all of the property de~igtnated in 
the notic-e as a whole, his actions in such partic-
ular would doubtless be void as offending against 
thP. provisions of 
R. S. TJ. 1933, 104-37 -23~ 
We shall therefore confine our discussion to thP 
note and if respondents claim that the sheriff sold 
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anything other than the note \Ye may \Yish to meet 
such clain1 in a reply brief. 
While the notice of sale indicated that the sale wa8~ 
to be had on the 28th day of Jnuuary, 1935 at 10:00 
A. M., the return of the sheriff sho\Y8 that the sale 
actually took place on the 29th day of January, 
1935, ·at 9 :30 A. M. An exanuna tion of the return 
shows that the 29th repre~enting the date of .Jan-
uarv and the hour 9:30 have both been changed. 
Th~ trial court p~rmitted the sheriff, Virgil 
Fraughton, to testify over the objection of appel-
lants that on the 28th day of January he postponed 
the sale to the next day at 9:30. Appellants assign 
such ruling as error. (Assignments 3 and 4; Ab. 
225-226). The sheriff further testified that as he· 
recalled 1\Ir. ~[organ called on the 'phone and asked 
to have the sale postponed, but he conld be mi~ 
taken. ( Tr. 16; _t\_b. 115). That a year or so ago 
Mr. Morgan came into the sheriff's offiee and 
made inquiry about the sale, but that he, the ~Sher­
iff, did not then recall or say anything about post-
poning the sale. The sheriff further testified that 
he made a memorandun1 of postponing the sale in 
a book. Over objection of appellants the book was 
received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. The 
admission of thP book into evidence is assigned a.s · 
error (Ab. 226). Th(:\ memorandum .about postpon-
ing the sale is the last entry on that page of the 
book and the only ~ntry in the book relating to 
sales. J. Rulon l\f organ testified that he did not 
call up the sheriff about postponing the sale; that 
he \Vas at Heber City on the 28th day of January .. 
1939; that he watched to see 'vhat thP sheriff din 
about the sale. That the sheriff did not postponP. 
the sale. ( Tr. 39-42 ; A b. 120-121). W rn. H. Baird 
testified that he "ras vvith J. Rulon Morgan on 
.Tannary 28, 1935, and that the sheriff djd not 
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appear at the fron_t door of the court house and 
postpone the sale. (Tr. 43-44; Ab. 121). Not-
withstanding this. state of the record, the trial court 
found that ,J. Rulon Morgan did call up the sheriff 
and the sheriff did postpone the sale. Appellants 
have assigned such finding as error. (Assign-
ments 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 2.2; A b. 231-232). While 
it is competent for the sheriff, if need be, to re-
fresh his memory by· referring to the book, ·Exhibit 
5, the entry therein was not comp~etent evidence. 
22 c. J. 89'5.i 
When the sheriff makes a return as required by 
law, such return becomes a. public record and may 
not be varied by the sheriff's oral testimony. If 
the return is in error it may, with leave of court, 
be amended, but until am.ended it is (l;Onclus.ively 
presumed to state the truth. 
Huish v. Fenkell et al, 85 Utah 253; 39 P. 
(2d) 330. 
Moreover, in light of the uncertainty of the tes~ti­
mony of the sheriff as to what occurred in coimec-
tion with the sale:~ and in light of the written return 
ma.de by him, soon after the sale, and the testi-
mony of Mr. Morgan and Wm. H. Baird. there is 
little room for doubt as to where lieR the prepon-
derance of the evidence touching the failure of the 
sheriff to either make or postpone the sale on the 
date fixed in the notice. Moreover, neither in the 
sheriff's return nor in his oral testimony is there 
any evidence that a notice was p.osted in three pub-
lic places. The return merely recites tha.t the 
notices were posted as required by lavt, "rhich is 
a pure conclusion. The oral testin1cny of the 
sheriff adds nothing to such conclusion. If the 
sheriff did not postpone the sale and sold the prop-
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erty at a subsequent date, a sale on the latter date 
'vas equivalent to a sale 'vithout notie(:~. 
In the absence of a proper notice of sale the sam(\ 
is void or of no effect. 
Henderson v. Hays, 41 N. J. 2387. 
Hughes v. \V.att, 26 Ark. 228. 
Collins v. Smith, 57 Wis. 284. 
In re Phillips Estate, 86 Utah Jf)S; -!:-! Pac. 
(2d) 699 and cases there cited. 
THE CONSIDER.L\.TION PAID FOR THE NC)TE 
\\:-AS SO GROSSLY INADJ(JQlT.A.TE THAT 
A COURT OF EQUITY vVILL NOT PERMIT 
THE SALE TO STAND. 
There are expressions in some cases to the effect 
that courts "\\rill not set aside a sale solely because 
of an inadequate price. However, when there are 
irregularities in the proceedings antedating the sale, 
or where there is any unfair dealing, in connection 
with the sale in addition to gross inadequacy of 
price, the courts uniformly refuse to recognize the 
validity of a sale. 
23 C. J. 680 and cases there cited. 
We have heretofore pointed out that there were 
irregularities in every step had in the proceedings 
whereby the l\Jloultons pretended to attach and Rell 
under execution the fifteen thousand dollar note. 
Many of such proceedin~s, as we have pointed out, 
were not mere irregularities, but 'vere so .contrary 
to law as to render the l~vy and sale of the note 
void and of no effect. V\T e shall not repeat what 
we have heretofore said. 
Some of the present counsel for the Monltons seem 
to have appreDiated the fact that to purchase a fif-
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teen thousand dollar note upon which there Waf{ 
nearly six yea.rs accrued interest for one hundred 
dollars is so shocking to the conscience of a court 
of justice that at thE; trial they stated that they 
\vould not ask for a deficiency judgnu~nt against 
Ver~or and would credit on the judgment against 
,Josie and J. Harold Giles the amount they will 
realize fro1n a sale of the property. Such promise, 
which the court below imvroperly characterized as 
an agreen1ent, does not alter the situation or sup-
port th~ sale of the note. 
Hamilton v. Burch_ 28 Ind. 233. 
. I 
Gallagher v. Abadie, 26 La .. Ann. 343_ 
CEB;TIFICATES OF STOCJ{ N1T~1BEREJ) n4 
AND 68 HAVING BEEN PURCHASED BY 
EI~IZA.BETH ,J. BAIRD· FR,Ol\1 THFJ LAKE 
CREEK IRRIGATIOIN COl\tiP ANY, "\VHICII 
ACQUIRED TITLE THER,ETO BECAUSE 
OF A ]j-,AILURE TO PAY ASSESSnlENTS, 
ARE NOT IN ANY EVENT S fJBJECT TO 
A LIEN AS SECURITY FOR TI-IE PAY-
MENT OF THE FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
DOLLAR NorrE. 
What we have heretofore said touching the sale 
of the two certificates of stock numbered 64 and 68 
in connection with the claim of the Bank of Heber 
City is applicable to the claims of the Moultons. 
we shall not repeat our contention in sucn re-
spect. ,If Mrs. Baird acquired title to the t'vo cer-
tificates, as appellants contend she did, it neees-
sarily follows that the l\foultons have no valid clain1 
against such certificateB. 
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JOSIE BAIRD GILES S~IITH AND J. I{ULON 
MORGAN, AS EXECUTOR llb' 'l,HE L.A.Srl.t 
'VILL .A.ND TESrrA~tENrr OF, E.LIZABE1'l:f 
J. BAIR-D. H..:-\.\TE ... L\. l~.IGHrr 'rO .I\. HU~1E­
STEAD IN THE :B,IFTEEN THOUSAND 
DOLLAR. NOTE .L\Nl) 1.~Hl~ I.JAND -4\KD 
\V.A.TER STOOl{ CO\rER.ED BY THE 
~IORTGAGE. 
After the trial court orally announced wha~t his 
decision would be, .Josie Baird Giles S1nith and .J. 
Rulon Morgan, as executor of the __ estate of Eliz-
abeth J. Baird, deceasedj filed a petition in these 
causes. wherein they alleged, among other things,, 
that from October 10, 1921 up to J·uly 16, 1934, 
Josie Baird Giles and J. I-Iarold (tiles '\vere husband 
and ... \vife. That there '\Tas one n1inor child, thP. 
issue of the marriage, \Vho at all times fi·om the 
date of her birth to and including- February 1 ~ 1935, 
resided with said Josie Baird Giles. and was 
dependent upon her for support. That prior to 
the time that .Josie Baird Giles made, ex~cuted and 
delivered the warranty deed to Vern or E. Baird 
on October 10, 1929, Josie Baird Giles, and hor hus-
band, resided upon the property mentjoned and 
described in the mortgage and used the property 
as their home and for the support of ~J Of3ie and her 
husband, J. Harold G-iles, and the child, the issue 
of the said marriage, and tha.t Josie also used the 
watE?r rigllt represented by the certificates of stock, 
togetJ1er with the 'vater appurtenant to the land to 
irrigate the same .. 
That neither Josie Baird Giles nor J. Harold Giles. 
at any time prior to February 1, 1935, o"\vner1 any 
real estate other than that mentioned. That .ToRje 
Baird Giles was at all times, prior to ],ehrua.ry 1, 
1935. an actual and bona fide resident of v\T asa.t~h 
County, Utah. That on October 10~ 1929~ Josifl 
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Baird Giles made a deed to the property n1entioned 
in the eomplaint filed herein and that Vernor E. 
Baird: and his \vife, Mary, delivered to Georg·e B. 
Stanley the note and mortgage mentioned and set 
out in the complaint; that Josie Baird Giles never 
Tece~ived any payment on the note excepting the 
:)urn of ten dollars, and that she never, at any time, 
recPived the fifteen thousand dollar note. r~ehe 
petitioners claimed that· Josie Baird Giles was en-
titled to a homestead ELxemption of any interest that 
i3he might have in the note and the property given 
to secure the same and that Elizabeth .J. Baird was 
entitled to any exemptions that Josie may ha:ve ha.d 
to the p~roperty covered by the note. ( .. A.h. 70 to 
72). An answer was filed to the petition, ,vhich in 
the main denies the alleg1ations in the p1eti tion (A b. 
73). Thereafter a stipulation was entered into be-
tween the parties as to the facts, \\7 hjch will bP 
found on pagoe 75 of the abstract. 
The cl::dm to some or all of the property involved 
in this controversy, or the proceeds to be deriveu 
from the sale of such property, must of necessity 
proceed upon the assumption that the issues raised 
in the main case have been properly decided a,gainst 
the appellants. In our argument that J. Rulon 
Morgan, as executor of the last will and te·stament 
of Elizabeth J. Baird as grantee of Josie Baird 
is entitled to any homestead exemption that ,Josie 
\Vas entitled to assert, \Ye of course do not 'vish to 
concede that the·re is any occasion under the facts 
in this case to rely upon a homestead. 
The Stta.tutory provisions· upon which we relv arP, · 
R. S. lJ. 1933, 38-0-1 · 
''A homestead cons'iRting of land~, appur-
tenaner:R and ]mprovements1 W'hich lands 
Inay be in one or more localities, not ex-
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ceeding in value with the ap~purtena.nces and 
improven1ents thereon the sun1 of $2,000.00 
for the head of the fnmily and the further 
surn of $750.00 for the spouse, and $300.00 
for each other member of the fan1ily, shall 
be exempt from judgment lien and from 
execution or forced sale.'· etc. 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2·: 
''"lb. en a homestead is. conveyed by the 
o"\vner thereof, ~uch conveyance shall not 
subject the premises to any lien or encum-
brance to which it would not be subject in 
the hands of the o'\\7Jler, and the proceeds 
of the sale thereof, to the amount of the ex-
emption existing at the time of s.a.le, shall 
be exempt from execution or other ;process 
for one year after the receipt thereof by 
the person _entitled to the exemption '' 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-8 : 
"It shall be the privilege of either the huR-
band or the· \vife to claim and select a hoJne-
stead to the full extent prescribed in this 
title on the failure of the other, being the 
judgment debtor, to make such claim or 
selection. ' ' 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-10: 
''A home~tead claimant may make a dec-
laration of homestead in the manner rro-
vided in the next t'vo sections, but a fail-
ure to make such declaration shall not im-
pair the hon1estead right.'' 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-15 : 
"The homestead shall not he sold if thP 
bid does not exceed the valup, of the e:x-
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emption \vhen the homestead 1s In one 
piece.'' etc. 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-19 ~ 
''If homestead peoperty js sold on execution, 
the proceeds paid the judgment debtor shall 
be exempt from execution or other process 
for one year after receip~t thereof by the 
person entitled to the exemption.'' 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-4: 
"Water rights and interest either in the 
form of corporate stock or otherwise, owned 
by the judgment debtor shall be exen1pt 
from execution to the extent that such 
rights and interest are necessarily em-
ployed in supplying water to the home-
stead for domestic and irrigation pur-
poses.'' 
R. S. U. 19.33, 38-0-13: 
''If the owner is married, no conveyance 
or encumbrance of, or contract to convey 
or encumber, the premises selected and re-
corded as a homestead prior to the time of 
such conveyance, encumbrance or contract 
is valid unless both the husband and wife 
join in the execution of the same.~' 
The provisions of our hom~stead law have been 
before and construed by this Court on so many 
occasions that we do not deem it necessary to ex-
amine cases from other jurisdictions touching the 
matters raised in the petitions of Josie Baird Gil~s 
(Smith) and J. Rulon Morgan. 
The Petitioners contend: rrha.t Josie Baird Giles 
(Smith) was entitled to a. claim for a home·~dead to 
the amoltnt of $2,000.00 for herself, $-300.00 for her 
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minor child, and $750.00 for her husband. As to 
her right to a homestead for hersL·lf and the child 
there 'Yould seem to be no serious doulJt. It \vill 
probably be contended that in any event Josie had 
no right to make the c1aim of $750.00 for J. Harold 
Giles in light of the fact that she secured an inter-
locutory decree of diYorce fro1n hhn on July 16, 
1934. However, the divorce did not become final 
until six n1onths after it ''Tns granted and therefore 
J. Harold Giles was the husband of .Josie Baird 
Giles at the time the note. was 1delivered to the 
sheriff, as 'Yell as at the time the note is claimed 
to have been sold under execution sale. It is held 
In re Johnson's Estate, 35 P. (2d) 305, 
that the entry of divorce decree does not at once 
terminate marriag~e relationship and give the part-
ies the status of single persons ; that the marriage 
relationship is dissolved when decree becomes final 
which is· six months after the date of entry. 
It will be observed that 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2 and 38-0-19 
provide that theo proceeds derived from the sale of 
a homestead shall be exempt from execution for 
one year after receipt thereof by the p·erson en-
titled to th~ exemption. Moreover, if Josie was 
entitled to claim a homestead exemption for her-
self and the minor child, the sale of the note !or 
only one hundred dollars was a nullity. 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-15 provides: 
''The homestead shall not be sold if the 
bid does not exceed the value of the exemp-
tion when the homestead is in one piece,'' 
etc. 
The note was one obligation and the sheriff was 
without authority to sri~ the same until and unless 
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the claim of a homestead was, first satisfied. In 
the case of 
Payson Exchange Bank v. Teitjen, (13 Utah 
321; 225 P. 598, at Page 325 of the Utah 
report it is said : 
''The great weight of authority, under 
statutes similar to ours, is to the effect 
that a judg.ment is not a lien against 
premises impressed with the homestead 
character and subject to the ho1nestead 
use, and that an attachment or execution 
attempted to be levied thereon is absolute-
ly void." 
And again on Page 32·6 of the Utah report it is 
said: 
"The fact~ however, is that in legal effect 
an order of a court directing a sale of 
exempt prop~erty is stillbqrn, and, like an 
execution, is without any effect whatever.'' 
It will probably be contended by the Moultons that 
the sheriff being without notice of the claim of 
homestead by anyone, such clai.m vvas waived. 
There are some cases from our own Supreme Court 
which hold that a homestead claim n1ay be made 
at any time 1before sale. Among the cases so :hold-
Ing are 
1-Iansen v. Mauss, 40 Utah 361; 121 P. 605. 
Payson Exchange Savings Bank v. Tiet-
jen, 63 Utah 321; 225 P. 598. 
Bunker v. Coons, 21 Utah 164; 60 P. 549. 
Folsom v. Asper, 25 Utah 229: 71 P. 315. 
None of· these cases, however, are authorities for 
the converse, namely that the homestead right is 
\vaived unless asserted at or before sale. In any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
61 
event none of these cas.es aid thP M.oultons, for th(' 
obvious reason that before the sale of tlte note in 
question, the mortgage had been released and 
property covered by the Inortgage conveyed to 
Elizabeth J. Baird, both of 'vhich instru1nents ·11ad 
heen placed of record in the office of the County 
Recorder of ''r asat.ch County before the sale of tho 
note, and such recording in1parted notice to all per~ 
sons dealing with the property that Josie Ba:ird 
Giles and her mother, Elizabeth J. Baird, claimPd 
that the p~rop~erty 'vas not subject to sale. 
~Iore-over, in the absence of notice of levy and sale 
to the claimant, the right to assert a homestead 
is not waived. 
Kimball v. Salisbury, 19 Utah 161; 56 P. 
973: 17 Utah 381, 53 P. 1037. 
Notice to sheriff before sale is ·sufficjent. Bunker 
v-. Coons, Hansen v. niauss and Payson Exchange 
Savings Bank v. Teitjen, suprB-
Indeed it is said in the Teitjen ca~e, ~upra, at 
Page 326 that: 
"It may also be doubted whether an offi-
cer or anyone else under any eircunl-
stances may sell or dispose of a homestead 
without becoming liable unless he does so 
with the cons.ent and approval of the home-
stead claimant, and if such claimant he 
married, then with the consent of both hus-
band and wife.'' 
Following the last quotation this Court cites cases 
which it apparently believes support the doctrine 
that a sale of' a homestead rig·ht is a nullity unles~ 
consented to by the parties interested. 
Tt will probably be contended on behalf of the 
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Moultons that Josie Baird Giles (Smith) does not 
bring herself within the provisions of 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2 or 38-0-19 
because the note 'vas executed considerably more 
than one year prior to the date of the sheriff's sale 
thereof. It will be ·remembered that all of the evi-
dence is to the effect that Josie never, at any time, 
had the :actual custody of the note. She did not in 
the language of }the statute, "receive" the p·ro-
·Ceeds of the sale of the land and shares of capital 
stock whicl,t she conveyed or agreed to convey to 
Vernor. The only evidence in the record is that of 
Josie where she testified that she reeetived only 
$10.00 from V_ernor, which of course would pay the 
interest for only a few days. . If, aS' we assumed in 
preparing our pleadings in the original action, 1\f r. 
Stanley had conceded that he waR the attorney for 
Josie and that as such his possession of the note 
was tb~-possession of Josie, there might be merit 
to a claim that Josie had "received" the note, 
which was the proce·eds of the sale. However, he 
disclaims any such relation to Josie and app,arent ... 
ly takes the position tha.t he V\ras not the agent or 
attorney for Josie. If such be the fact, then in 
contemplation of law, Vernor never parted with 
the note, in which event it would be idle to say that 
tT oRie ba.d received the proceeds of the sale of th~ 
farm. 
It is in effe·ct stated in the findings that .Josie could 
have received the note had she so desired. The 
statute does not either by exp,ress word~ or by itn-
plication say that the proceeds of the sale of ex-
tempt p:rop,erty shall be exempt for one year after 
the party claiming the exemption could ha:ve re .. 
ceived such proceeds. Quite to the contrary it 
says ''after the r~ceipt thereof.'' To cons.true this 
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lang·uage to n1ean after the claimant could have 
received the proceeds 'Yould be doing Yiolenee to 
the express provisions of the statute. 
~he principles announced by this Court 1n the 
cases of 
Christensen v. Beebe. 32 ·utah 406 · 91 P. 
. ' 129, and 
Giesy-Walker Co., Y. Brig-gs, 49 Utah 205; 
162 P. 876, 
preclude the J\1:oultons from suc:cessfully 111aking 
the claim that Josie had received payment for the 
farm a.nd water stock. 
If the note of Josie ,,~as exempt from levy on ex-
ecution she had a right to dispose of it as she saw 
fit. The Moultons could not complain if she ga:ve 
it a'vay, cancelled it or sold it to someone else. In 
other \Yords, the ~1 oultons could not by the levy of 
an attachment or execution deprive her of s11ch 
right. Even though she did not have a right to 
dispose of the whole note, she none th~ less. had .an 
absolute right to dispose of such part of the note 
as equalled her exemption. If she ch osn, to can-
cel the note and mortgage in return for the farm 
she had, within the lin1its of her exemptions, a right 
to do so. 
R. ~- lJ. 1933, 38-0-9. 
In snch ca:se tbP 1\foultons havp no just cause to 
complain. 
Moreover, Elizabeth J. Baird acquired the exempt 
property free from any claim of the judgment 
creditors of Josie. If one entitled to a homestead 
exemption is unable to convey the exempt property 
freed from the claim of the judgment creditor, then 
of course the handR of the judgment creditor are 
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tied so that such a person could not dispose of 
property to which he has an absolute right unfet-
tered by any claim of the judgment creditor. Such 
is the 1clear p~ronouncement of our statute and such 
has been the doctrine repeatedly announced by this 
Court 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-2 .. 
Pa.yson Exchange Savin~s Bank v. Teitjen, 
63 Utah 321 ; 225 P. 598. 
Antelope Shearing Corral Co. v. Con. 
·w a.gon & Mach. Co., 54 Utah 355; 180 
P. 597. 
V olker-Scowcroft Lumber Company, etal, 
v. Vance, et al. 36 Utah 348; 103 P. 
970. 
By the levy of an attachment and execution on the 
note and the taking the same by the sheriff, Josie 
could not be deprived of her right of a homestead 
claim in her own right or he deprived of her right 
to convey such exempt property to others. To per-
mit such a result "\vould constitute a limitation or 
deprivation of the right, \\7hieh the law does not 
countenance. This right was exercised by .J osi.e 
before the sale insofar as she "\Vas able to exerci~e 
the right 
As to the claim of a hon1estead exemption to the 
stock held by the bank: 
We have already directed the Court's attention to 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-4. 
\vhere it is provided that water used upon e~empt 
real property is exempt. As early as 1898 our 
Sup1reme ·Court held that the homestead exemp-
tion is not a mere privilege conferred upon the head 
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of a family} but an absolute. right, intended to 
secure and protect the hon1e ag~ainst creditors. as 
a means of support to eyery family in the State, 
and no waiver of the homestead right could affect 
the interest of the \vife and children composing 
the family. 
\Vhen the homestead consists of one or more pieces 
of land \vithin the value lin1ited by statute, and is 
established by selection or occupancy, the constitu-
tion and statute enacted under it are a positive 
prohibition against levy and sale thereof by cred-
itors of the owner of the homestead. 
Kimball v. Le,vis, 17 Utah 381; 53 P. 1037. 
\V e have also heretofor~ called the Court's atten-
tion to 
R. S. U. 1933, 38-0-13 
That section was r construed in the case of 
Nielson v. Peterson, 30 Utah 391; 85 P. 429. 
By a divided Court it was held that a husband could 
mortgage his interest in p~roperty used as ~ res-
idence by the family where there was no recorded 
declaration of a homestead. Mr. Justice- Straup 
in a dissenting opinion took the view that the wife 
not having joined in the mortgage had a right to 
lay clajm to and preserve the home for herself and 
family. In that case it was exp-ressly held that the 
husband was without authority to mortg-age any in-
terest that 'the wife might have. The stock in-
volved in the case belonged to the wife. H~r inter-
est could not be jeopardized by any act of the hus-
band. Certainly her right a8 an owner to home-
~tead prop1erty is entitled to as much protection as 
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would have been accorded her if she had declared 
a homestead in her husband's prop.erty. If thP~ 
rights of a married woman, especially in property 
\vhich constitutes a homestead 1nay be disposed o£ 
by the husband in the manner shown by the evi-
dence in this case, then indeed has the vvife a long 
way to travel before she is emancipated. 
We submit the claim of a homestead as agJainst 
the attachment and sale under execution bv the. 
~\1 oultons should be sustained, and like~se ··upon 
this record, if for no other reason, the clai1n of a 
homestead right in the water stock preclndeR the 
bank from maintaining its~ lien. 
The evidence in this case shows. that at the request 
of Elizabeth J. Baird a.note for five thousand dol-
lars was given to Morgan & Morgan for the pur-
pose of securing them in the paym~nt of a fee and 
to enable them to, if possible, secure money to pro-
tect the water stock held by the Bank of Heber 
City. The note was given just before the deed was 
executed by Vernor to his mother. Vernor signed 
the mortgage because his mother \\ ... as in Cali-
fornia. The mortgage by Vernor to Morgan & 
Morgan and the deed from Vern or to his mother 
.were placed on record a day or two before the 
sheriff sold the fifteen thousand dollar note. It 
also appears that ·Wm. fl. Baird as attorney in 
fact for Josie released the mortgage of record a 
day or two before the note was sold. Of cours.e we 
do not contend that the execution and recording 
of these instruments could affect any lien or claim 
that the Moultons may have had in the land cov--
ered by the mortgage. The finn of 1\Iorgan & 
Morgan of course kne\v that such was the law, but 
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the recording of those instrun1ents \vould preclude 
anyone \vho nlight have purchased the note at the 
sheriff's sale fron1 claiming that he 'vas an inno-
cent purchaS'er of the note, believing that it was 
secured by a mortgage. As these transactions· do 
not affect the questions presented for determina-
tion on this appeal, \Ye refrain from further dis-
cussion of the same. 
We submit that the judgment. and decree appealed 
from should be reversed and the trial court dire·cted 
to recast its findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
decree and judgment to the end that appellants be 
awarded judgment to the effect that neither of the 
respondents haH any lien on the water and land 
involved in this litigation, and that appellant~ b~ 
awarded their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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